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Abstract 
Fluid Mechanics, Models, and Realism: Philosophy at the Boundaries of Fluid Systems 
Jeffrey Michael Sykora, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2019 
Philosophy of science has long drawn conclusions about the relationships between laws, 
models, and theories from studies of physics. However, many canonical accounts of the epistemic 
roles of laws and the nature of theories derived their scientific content from either schematized or 
exotic physical theories. Neither Theory-T frameworks nor investigation on interpretations of 
quantum mechanics and relativity reflect a majority of physical theories in use. More recently, 
philosophers of physics have begun developing accounts based in versions of classical mechanics 
that are both homelier than the exotic physical theories and more mathematically rigorous than the 
Theory-T frameworks of the earlier canon. Some, including Morrison (1999, 2015), Rueger 
(2005), and Wilson (2017), have turned to the study of fluid flows as a way to unpack the complex 
relationships among laws, models, theories, and their implications for scientific realism.  
One important result of this work is a resurgence of interest in the relationship between the 
differential equations that express mechanical laws and the boundary conditions that constrain the 
solutions to those equations. However, many of these accounts miss a crucial set of distinctions 
between the roles of mathematical boundary conditions modeling physical systems, and the roles 
of physical conditions at the boundary of the modeled system. In light of this systematic oversight, 
in this dissertation I show that there is a difference between boundary conditions and conditions at 
the boundary. I use that distinction to investigate the roles of boundary conditions in the models 
of fluid mechanics. I argue that boundary conditions are in some cases more lawlike than 
previously supposed, and that they can play unique roles in scientific explanations. Further, I show 
 v 
that boundaries are inherently mesoscale features of physical systems, which provide explanations 
that cannot be inferred from microscale dynamics alone. Finally, I argue that an examination of 
the domain of application of boundary conditions supports a form of realism.  
 vi 
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Preface 
This dissertation explores several aspects of the roles of boundary conditions in fluid 
mechanics. When this project was initially conceived, I had envisioned a single chapter on the 
topic of boundary conditions. As I began developing that chapter, I discovered that the topic was 
far richer than I had imagined, and soon boundary conditions became the guiding theme of the 
entire dissertation.  
Chapter 1 explores the role of boundary conditions in fluid mechanics. I contrast the ways 
that philosophers and physicists have historically conceived of the role of boundary conditions in 
fluid modeling, and I argue that boundary conditions are in some cases more lawlike than 
previously supposed. In particular, they are capable of performing functions similar to that of laws 
in scientific explanations. Still, they cannot be restricted to any particular role in theories of 
explanation solely in virtue of the fact that they are boundary conditions. The way they function 
in explanations depends on their function in a scientific model.  
Chapter 2 draws a distinction that has escaped attention in the philosophical literature: the 
distinction between boundary conditions and conditions at the boundary. This distinction was 
recognized by Brenner and Ganesan in the context of diffusive fluid systems. Though they draw 
the distinction as one between molecular models and fluid dynamics, I argue that the distinction is 
not tied to ant particular theory or scale. Rather, the distinction depends only on whether or not the 
interactions between the fluid and the boundary are explicitly taken into account.   
Chapter 3 shifts focus by looking at how the boundaries themselves figure into 
explanations. I draw a distinction between boundaries in the models of fluid dynamics and 
boundaries in the models of molecular dynamics. In molecular dynamics models, mesoscale 
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features of solid boundaries give rise to behaviors that cannot be explained only by looking at 
either the continuum level description of a fluid system or a molecular level description. I develop 
an extended example of the explanatory role of boundaries through a case study on the formation 
of nanobubbles on the interior of a pipe. The formation of nanobubbles, which determine slip 
properties of a flow, cannot be explained solely by the interactions described by molecular 
dynamics.  
Chapter 4 investigates implications of the previous chapters’ discussion for contemporary 
approaches to scientific realism. I introduce the concept of a model’s domain of application in 
response to some antirealist critiques that have been directed at the no-slip boundary condition. 
Knowing how intervening in the conditions under which a model succeeds or fails gives us causal 
knowledge about the no-slip condition. I argue that this knowledge supports a local realism 
concerning the no-slip condition based on its domain of application. I contrast this local realism 
with scientific perspectivism. 
While I think the arguments made in this dissertation are interesting in their own right, I 
believe further exploration of these ideas will prove even more rewarding. One of the major 
limitations of this dissertation is that I have chosen to focus not only just on the boundary 
conditions of fluid mechanics, but on a small subset of these. Further investigation into the nature 
of a wider array of boundary conditions from different areas of science might broaden the scope 
of the conclusions I have drawn here, or conversely, result in a different set of conclusions unique 
to the boundary conditions in those areas. Another avenue of further investigation is in the tradition 
of questioning standard accounts of lawhood. Although I have employed the language of laws and 
lawlikeness, I think this work is part of a school of thought that sees a strict delineation of laws 
and not-laws as ultimately fruitless. This work contributes to a general account of science that 
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dispenses with standard accounts of laws. Finally, while I have been as careful as possible in 
describing the science, someone with a keener mathematical insight than I have might be able to 
come to additional conclusions based on the unique mathematical features of individual boundary 
conditions.  
This dissertation would not have been possible without support, criticism, suggestions, 
challenges, and encouragement from some very special people. Thanks first to my dissertation 
committee: Jim Woodward, Sandra Mitchell, Bob Batterman, and Porter Williams. They stuck 
with me throughout the long process of writing this. From initial conception to final revisions, 
their input has made a deep impact on my thinking and on the content of this dissertation. The 
ideas in here are also shaped by John Norton and Mark Wilson, whose guidance earlier in my 
graduate career at Pittsburgh helped shape my philosophical outlook. I am grateful to the members 
of the Philosophy faculty at the University of Washington who ignited my interest in philosophy 
of science: Cass Weller, Andrea Woody, Arthur Fine, Adam Moore, William Talbot, Gwynne 
Taraska, and Carole Lee. Without them, I do not know how I would have found this path. I am 
also grateful to my fellow graduate students Kathryn Tabb, Keith Bemer, Lei Jiang, Trey Boone, 
and Joe McCaffrey. We were all getting through it together, from late nights working at the 
cathedral to late nights playing pool. Thanks to my family, especially my parents Joseph and 
Eveline Sykora, whose unconditional love and support I can always count on, and my brother Bob 
Sykora, who has been an inspiration to me as I watch him forge his own path in life. Finally, thanks 
to Julia Sykora Bursten, who has always been exactly what I need. She was there to read drafts, to 
talk about ideas, and she was there to laugh with or cry with, when I needed that too. She is always 
there for me, absolutely unwavering, my safe home. And she walked with me on this journey, 
every single step.  
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1.0 Boundary Conditions in Fluid Mechanical Models 
Historically and presently, philosophers have tended to treat boundary conditions as 
relatively unimportant features of scientific modeling. Compared to scientific laws, which have 
been the focus of many philosophical accounts, boundary conditions are not usually even thought 
to be worth exploring on their own, receiving only passing mention. And with some notable 
exceptions, they have only played secondary roles in various philosophical endeavors like 
scientific explanation and accounts of causation. Usually, when boundary conditions are 
mentioned in such work, they are treated as merely contingent or even freely choosable parameters 
that are not even properly part of a theory. In virtue of their supposed contingency, they are treated 
as epistemically secondary as well. In contrast, knowledge about laws is thought to be justified 
based on not only empirical considerations, but also on knowledge of more fundamental physical 
facts. Moreover, laws of nature, and especially physical laws, are typically thought of as generating 
the epistemic and explanatory content in models of physical systems. In this chapter, I argue 
against this dominant view of the epistemic humility of boundary conditions. I show that, instead, 
there are characteristic parts of physics in which the boundary conditions play a variety of essential 
epistemic roles. 
I will develop my account by taking a closer look at how boundary conditions function in 
the models of fluid dynamics, and at how they relate to the set of governing equations of fluid 
dynamics. In particular, I will look at the boundary condition that specifies the extent to which a 
fluid slips past a solid surface. In this context, boundary conditions often play a role just as 
important as the governing equations, and they have more in common with scientific laws than 
might be at first apparent. Because of these similarities, boundary conditions can play some 
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familiar epistemic roles that philosophers of science have typically ascribed to laws. However, 
boundary conditions are not laws. They can also play unique roles in explanations, different from 
the role of laws and different from the role of contingent facts. The upshot of all of this is that 
boundary conditions play an important and complex role in science that is often overlooked and 
obscured by their treatment in philosophical accounts. The case of fluid mechanics is instructive 
for boundary conditions generally, and similar lessons might be drawn for other areas of physics, 
as well as for other sciences. However, in light of their varied uses, it is also unlikely that a single 
account of boundary conditions will cover all cases.  
1.1 Boundary Conditions in Philosophy of Science 
References to boundary conditions have shown up in philosophical discussions of science 
for a long time, and in varied contexts. In discussions of explanation, causation, and confirmation, 
for example, boundary conditions have played a role. Often, they are found in conjunction with 
their more esteemed counterparts, scientific laws. But their precise role is less commonly 
examined, if at all. To make matters worse, philosophers have often used the term “boundary 
conditions” quite loosely, referring to a variety of things that are not in fact boundary conditions 
in the sense used by scientists. In some cases, philosophers have even used the phrase “boundary 
condition” metaphorically. In the web of belief metaphor that characterizes Quine’s epistemic 
outlook, for example, “total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are 
experience.” (Quine, 1953, p. 42) And although this metaphorical use is not particularly relevant 
to this discussion, it gives us an idea of how broadly the term “boundary condition” has been used.  
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Aside from such metaphorical usage, I can find two broad senses in which philosophers 
have employed the notion of a boundary condition. On the one hand, they appear in work on more 
general problems in philosophy of science. In these cases, we find claims about boundary 
conditions that are either wrong or so vague as to be unhelpful in really understanding their roles 
in science. On the other hand, they appear in more technical discussions by philosophers of 
physics. And while in these cases boundary conditions are used in technically correct ways, these 
discussions do not give insight into how boundary conditions should figure into larger 
philosophical discussion. I discuss each of these philosophical uses of boundary conditions in turn.  
1.1.1  General Uses of Boundary Conditions in Philosophy of Science 
Looking at the first sense, philosophers have used the concept of boundary conditions to 
refer vaguely to a variety of things. In some philosophical accounts of explanation, for instance, 
scientific laws do special work, and anything that is not a law — such as a boundary condition — 
often gets tossed into the same basket of epistemically unimportant support for the development 
of a law-centered explanation. Boundary conditions end up being used interchangeably with things 
like auxiliary hypotheses, background conditions, or the like. Look at, for example, Hempel’s 
deductive-nomological model of explanation, where an explanation takes the form of a deductive 
argument in which the conclusion is the explanandum and the premises form the explanans. The 
explanans must include a law of nature, which is taken to be the major premise. But it must also 
include anything that is required to deduce the phenomenon to be explained. When talking about 
these additional premises, Hempel refers to “boundary conditions” and “outside influences” 
interchangeably. (Hempel, 1962, p. 107). He goes on to cite the example of such an outside 
influence: “a collision of Mars with and unexpected asteroid that affects its future orbit.” (Hempel, 
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1962, p. 116) . Elsewhere, he describes initial and boundary conditions (failing to distinguish 
between the two) as being cases of determining conditions, or “a set of statements asserting the 
occurrence of certain events C1,…Cn at certain times and places.” These statements form one part 
of an explanation, the other part being “a set of universal hypotheses,” which where we find the 
laws. (Hempel, 1965, p. 232) Thus boundary conditions are statements about particular events.  
We can find discussions similar to Hempel’s scattered throughout the literature. Looking 
at another example, when Hilary Putnam is discussing the corroboration of theories (Putnam, 
1974), he says that a theory is a set of laws. In contrast, statements like “all other bodies [in the 
solar system] exert forces small enough to be neglected” are not laws. Instead, that statement “is a 
statement about the ‘boundary conditions’ which obtain as a matter of fact in a particular system.” 
(p. 225) In this usage, “boundary conditions” function something like a ceteris paribus clause. 
They are contingent facts about a real system, but they interfere with the relations of interest. So 
by factoring them out, we can focus on the more important parts of the model. The relations of 
interest in this example are the laws that govern the motion of the planets in the solar system. In 
some broad sense, these “boundary conditions” do constrain the laws, but not in the more precise 
sense that I will explain in the next section.  
Aside from the imprecision with which these philosophers have used the concept of 
boundary conditions, there are a few things to note about these kinds of usages. The thing that 
characterizes boundary conditions here is their role in explanations or corroboration of theories. 
That is, the boundary condition’s role is decided by the philosophical theory, not its role in the 
scientific model. But this way of identifying boundary conditions gets things reversed. In this type 
of philosophical approach to boundary conditions, boundary conditions are divorced from the 
scientific and mathematical domain in which they properly reside. In such cases, philosophers 
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make the mistake of attempting to conform scientific theory to philosophical theory, rather than 
developing a philosophical theory from careful study of the behavior of scientific theory.  
Additionally, in this first mode of encountering boundary conditions philosophically, 
boundary conditions are always contrasted with laws (or lawlike statements), and the contrast 
favors laws over boundary conditions. Boundary conditions are demonstrated to be less important 
than laws along a variety of dimensions: they are smaller in scope, they are contingent rather than 
necessary, and they do not come with a background of theoretical support. Most importantly, they 
are highly variant under intervention, unlike stable, reliable laws.  
Now it should be noted that the misuse of boundary conditions in an account of scientific 
explanation does not by itself refute that account. There are good reasons to make a distinction 
between lawlike statements and accidental statements, or a distinction between universals facts 
and particular facts. It is clear, for example, that Hempel has in mind distinct roles for both laws 
(and lawlike statements) and contingent facts about the world. But it is not accurate to use this 
distinction to characterize the explanatory or epistemic roles played by boundary conditions. It 
might be argued that as long as philosophers define what they mean and are consistent in their 
usage, using “boundary conditions” in this way is not harmful. After all, the focus of these accounts 
is not boundary conditions as such, but rather more general philosophical concerns. But “boundary 
condition” is a term of art used by mathematicians, physicists, engineers, etc. Misuse of “boundary 
conditions” in this sense not only minimizes their role in theories and takes for granted the rich 
theoretical progression that often underlies their use, but it also confuses what boundary conditions 
actually are, which thereby prevents philosophical discourse from making contact with scientific 
discourse. In the next section I will show how boundary condition lead a much richer life and do 
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much more work than has be assumed. When we see this, we will be able to better appreciate their 
role in both scientific and philosophical theories.  
1.1.2  Boundary Conditions in Philosophy of Physics 
The other way philosophers have used boundary conditions is in the context of more 
technical discussions found in philosophy of physics. In discussions of field theories, spacetimes, 
foundational issues in quantum mechanics, and other topics that rely on mathematical formalism, 
boundary conditions often come into play.1 When setting up a field theory, for example, we must 
use the right boundary conditions in order to get things to behave nicely. For the most part, these 
uses are legitimate applications of the notion of a boundary condition. Boundary conditions are 
here treated as conditions that constrain the differential equations used. And more importantly, 
their role as boundary conditions is determined by their relation to other sets of equations.  
However, what this treatment of boundary conditions gains in accuracy, it lacks in 
philosophical reflection. These accounts offer little insight into the nature of boundary conditions 
themselves, and are generally not connected to the issues surrounding more general concerns. This 
is not an oversight, but rather merely a change of focus: unlike the general accounts in the previous 
subsection, the accounts here are not intended to be accounts of the kinds of things boundary 
conditions are. So even though these authors use boundary conditions in technically better ways 
than Hempel, Putnam, and others, boundary conditions are not the focus of their discussion either. 
These usages of boundary conditions do not engage with the more general philosophical problems 
                                                 
1 For plenty of these sorts of discussions, see Butterfield & Earman (2007) 
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like explanation or theory confirmation. And while these uses are not wrong, they usually do not 
emphasize boundary conditions’ importance.  
1.1.3  Other Treatments of Boundary Conditions 
Philosophers are perhaps not entirely to blame for the minimization of the role of boundary 
conditions. Indeed, fluid mechanics textbooks often downplay the importance of boundary 
conditions. Entire chapters are dedicated to the derivation and even history of the governing 
equations, while boundary conditions are often introduced with perhaps a paragraph or two of 
explanation.2 There are perhaps good reasons for this. The tools of fluid dynamics can be used 
(and taught) without going into details of why certain boundary conditions are used. And 
explanations for them require resources beyond fluid dynamics.  
So neither of the common philosophical treatments of boundary conditions really gives us 
an analysis of the concept. There are some exceptions to the trend though. Mark Wilson (2017; 
1990) explicitly addresses the relationship between differential equations and their boundary 
conditions in physics. George Ellis (2007) argues that there is difficulty in distinguishing between 
the laws of physics and boundary conditions in the cosmological context of the origin of the 
universe. And Mathias Frisch (2004) has made some similar points regarding initial conditions, 
namely that the distinction between purely contingent initial conditions and laws that are in some 
sense necessary is not as sharp as has been previously supposed. I see these as attempts to bring 
together the proper use of boundary conditions and general problems in philosophy of science. In 
the next section, I hope to add to these analyses by describing the role of boundary conditions in 
                                                 
2 For example, see (Wendt, 2009).  
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certain scientific models and shedding some light on how they can be used in more general 
discussions as well.  
1.2 Boundary Conditions at the Fluid-Surface Interface 
Boundary conditions play an indispensable role in fluid mechanics, and so in order to 
develop a clearer philosophical picture of the roles that boundary conditions play in physical 
theory, I will use fluid mechanics as a foundational example. To better understand the epistemic 
and explanatory roles of boundary conditions in fluid dynamics, I will review some of the relevant 
physical theory, attending to the various governing equations and boundary conditions that enter 
the picture. Then, I will discuss just what roles boundary conditions actually play in that theory. 
1.2.1  A Very Brief Overview of Fluid Dynamics 
The governing equations of fluid dynamics are a system of differential equations that can 
be derived by applying some fundamental physical principles to fluid systems. The continuity 
equation can be derived from the principle of conservation of mass, the momentum equation can 
be derived from Newton’s second law, and the energy equation can be derived from the principle 
of conservation of energy. (Anderson, 2009) These equations form a coupled system of non-linear 
partial differential equations, and each of these equations has different forms. The correct form to 
use in a given situation depends on the kind of system being modeled and the features of the system 
in which we are interested, as well as practical matters of computability. For example, each of the 
governing equations has a viscous form, which takes into account the phenomena of viscosity and 
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thermal conduction, and a non-viscous form, which does not take into account viscosity and 
thermal conduction. Additionally, each of the governing equations has a conservation and a non-
conservation form. The conservation form looks at a finite control volume fixed in space through 
which the fluid moves, while the non-conservation form looks at a finite control volume that 
contains the same set of fluid particles and moves with the fluid. Historically, the momentum 
equations for viscous flow were called the Navier-Stokes equations, but in much of the modern 
literature, the use of this name has been expanded to include all of the flow equations. I will just 
refer to these as the governing equations of fluid mechanics.  
These governing equations are used to describe fluid velocity, pressure density, and 
temperature with respect to space. But they are unable to describe a fluid system by themselves. 
They are only useful in conjunction with boundary conditions. And depending on the kind of 
system one is modeling, initial conditions might also be required, but I will not be considering 
initial conditions in this chapter. In the context of the governing equations of fluid mechanics, a 
boundary condition is a mathematical object that constrains solutions to those differential 
equations. Some typical boundary conditions types are Dirichlet boundary conditions which 
prescribe the value of unknowns on the boundary, Neumann boundary conditions which specify 
the normal gradient of the unknowns, and mixed boundary conditions which specify a combination 
of unknown quantities and their normal gradients. (Massoudi, 2007)  
A set of differential equation and boundary conditions constitutes a boundary value 
problem, the solution to which must satisfy the boundary conditions. We must keep in mind this 
specific mathematical function of boundary conditions when we look at their role in models. This 
will become especially important in the next chapter, where I talk about the difference between 
boundary conditions and conditions at the boundary. While a boundary condition determines 
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solutions to equations at the boundary, its effects can be felt away from the boundary as well. The 
extent of this effect depends on details of the flow in question, but the choice of boundary 
conditions often affects the entire flow field.   
1.2.2  Boundary Conditions in Fluid Dynamics: the Case of Slip 
In fluid dynamics, boundary conditions are necessary in a wide variety of situations. For 
example, when modelling a fluid flow through a pipe, we might specify a constant flux of fluid 
through the beginning and end planes of the pipe. Any solution to the governing equations must 
satisfy these inlet and outlet boundary conditions, and a change in these conditions would change 
the solutions to the equations. Boundary conditions can also specify how the fluid behaves at the 
boundary between two fluids. For example, we could specify that at the boundary between the 
fluids, stress is continuous from one fluid to the other. But for the rest of this chapter, I will focus 
on boundary conditions that specify the behavior of a fluid at a solid boundary.   
The boundary conditions that constrain the governing equations at the boundary between 
fluid and solid are some of the most common boundary conditions used in fluid-mechanical 
models. In most cases, the velocity component normal to the boundary is zero. Intuitively, this just 
assures that there is no transfer of mass across the boundary. But of much greater interest for us 
right now is the component of the fluid velocity tangential to the boundary. The tangential velocity 
of the fluid at the solid boundary is known as slip, since it measures the degree to which the fluid 
“slips” along the surface. In many situations, the boundary condition used is the no-slip condition, 
which requires that fluid elements directly on the surface of a solid boundary are stationary. That 
is, the fluid velocity goes to zero as it approaches the boundary.  
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The no-slip condition can be specified by setting the tangential velocity of the fluid to equal 
the velocity of the solid surface, which is zero if we are considering a stationary surface. But the 
no-slip condition can also be thought of as a special case of the Navier slip condition (Shu, Teo, 
& Chan, 2017): 
 
 
𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 = 𝜆𝜆 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑠𝑠 Equation 1 Navier slip condition 
 
The tangential velocity of the flow at the surface, us, is related to the shear rate, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
, at the 
surface. Here, x is the normal from the surface pointing into the liquid, and λ denotes a parameter 
called slip length. The subscript s refers to the value at the surface. Slip length can be interpreted 
as a fictitious distance below the solid surface at which the no slip condition would be satisfied if 
the fluid did extend past the solid surface. If the slip length goes to zero, the no-slip condition is 
recovered. This is illustrated in figure 1, where the length of the arrows represents the velocity of 
the fluid at various distances from the boundary, and the shaded area on the bottom represents the 
solid boundary.   
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Figure 1 Interpretation of the slip length λ  
Reprinted with permission from Lauga Brenner & Stone (2007) 
 
Note that velocity changes continuously within the fluid, but in the partial and perfect slip cases 
(0 < λ < ∞ and λ = ∞, respectively), there is a discontinuous change in velocity in moving from 
the fluid to the solid boundary (which is assumed to be motionless).  
Boundary conditions like slip are not just important at the boundaries. They help define the 
nature of a flow away from the boundary as well. The extent to which their effects are felt away 
from the boundary depends on the nature of the governing equations as well as physical parameters 
like viscosity. In general it is not possible to describe a flow without boundary conditions. Consider 
a fluid flowing through a channel. Figure 2 shows how the boundary conditions affect the rest of 
the flow.  
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Figure 2 The effect of slip on fluid flow  
Reprinted with permission from Jung & Bhushan (2010) 
 
In figure 2, we see arrows representing velocity vectors, but other flow variables are affected as 
well. For example, a slip boundary condition, like the partial-slip boundary condition depicted in 
the right half of the figure, results in a greater flow rate than a no-slip condition (depicted in the 
left half of the figure). The flow rate, Q, is the volume of fluid that passes per unit time. This 
relationship can be quantified for a circular pipe by the equation: 
 
 𝑄𝑄(𝜆𝜆)
𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
= 1 + 4𝜆𝜆
𝑎𝑎
 Equation 2 Flow rate through 
circular pipe 
 
Q(λ) is the flow rate with some slip length λ, QNS is the flow rate with the no-slip condition, and a 
is the radius of the pipe. The boundary condition has a dynamical impact throughout the system, 
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and so has more explanatory impact than supposed in the more generalized uses of boundary 
conditions 
Often, the scale of the flow determines the extent to which the boundary condition affects 
the rest of the flow. For macroscopic flows, small amounts of slip can have a negligible effect on 
the rest of the flow. If there is an actual slip length of, say, 10-5 meters, a macroscopic flow can 
effectively be modeled using the no-slip condition. However, there exist flows that are small 
enough that the region of flow greatly affected by the boundary conditions represents a large 
percentage of the flow, but large enough to be accurately modeled as a continuous medium. These 
flows can still be described by the governing equations of fluid dynamics, but they are small 
enough that microscopic amounts slip make significant difference in flow parameters like velocity 
profile and flow rate. When working with these smaller systems on the micro- or nanoscale, even 
this small amount of slip can make a large difference in the flow rate.  
Even for large scale flows, boundary conditions can play important roles. For example, 
when modeling the flow of air over an airfoil, the effects of viscosity of air are negligible for the 
regions of the flow away from the airfoil boundary. For these regions, the viscous terms can be 
dropped from the governing equations.  
However, in order to capture the aerodynamics at the wing correctly, the velocity must tend 
to zero; the no-slip boundary condition must apply. This means that viscosity is important near the 
boundary. In order to accommodate the importance of viscosity at the boundary, aerodynamics 
models are separated into far-field, viscosity-free models and boundary-layer models with distinct 
governing equations intended to accommodate the need for a no-slip boundary condition. To 
model the air flow around an air foil accurately, and to predict the amount of lift it will experience 
accurately, the velocity gradient normal to the surface must be large in the boundary-layer region. 
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Such a gradient requires the fluid have viscosity. Without this boundary layer, the model would be 
unable to account for the amount of lift applied to the airfoil. The far-field regions are best modeled 
with the viscosity-free versions of the governing equations, but the boundary layer is modeled with 
equations for viscous fluids. (Grundmann, 2009). Without the boundary condition, we could not 
explain how an airfoil moves through the air and provides lift for aircraft. 
1.3 Boundary Conditions and Laws 
In the next three subsections, I will look at how boundary conditions of fluid dynamics 
compare to the laws of fluid dynamics. To do this, I will look at boundary conditions’ degrees of 
invariance under intervention, the extent of their scope, and their levels of theoretical and empirical 
support. We will see that the degree to which boundary conditions are like laws varies from case 
to case.  
1.3.1  Boundary Conditions as Invariant under Intervention 
While there are differences between governing equations and boundary conditions, both 
are capable of playing similar roles in fluid mechanical models in terms of causation and 
explanation. In this section, I will argue that boundary conditions have some of the law-like 
features that the governing equations do, and so can play many of the roles of scientific laws in 
accounts of causation and explanation as well as give rise to unique issues of realism in models. 
My discussion is limited to laws in a particular domain of science, namely fluid dynamics. And 
although there are different conceptions of what it means to be a law, I do not have any particular 
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one in mind. But I will assume that if anything is a law of fluid dynamics, the governing equations 
are. And if the governing equations are the laws of fluid dynamics, then some boundary conditions 
should also be treated similarly to laws in many respects.  
In establishing this similarity, the first thing to look at is the role boundary conditions play 
in models. Like the governing equations, boundary conditions are generalizations about a system. 
In the case of the slip boundary condition, it is a generalization about the system that relates the 
velocity of the fluid at the boundary to the shear rate at the boundary.  
One of the key features in many accounts of law is that they are generalizations that are not 
merely accidental. One way of instantiating the non-accidental quality of lawlike generalizations 
is to frame them as capable of supporting counterfactuals, or alternatively to say that laws support 
confirmability by inductive inference. Like laws, boundary conditions represent stable relations 
between variables. This stability, encoded in the boundary conditions, allows generalizations of a 
non-accidental quality to be made.  
There is of course much disagreement about what exactly makes a generalization law-like 
or non-accidental. But I have in mind an account of lawlikeness like that of Woodward (2003). On 
this account, laws (or lawlike things) are invariant under intervention (or possible intervention), 
over various ranges of background conditions. I think this has the advantage of avoiding 
unnecessary metaphysical discussion surrounding the nature of laws, and it captures the way laws 
are used by scientists in models, including those of fluid dynamics. On this view it does not matter 
if a generalization is genuinely a law of nature (whatever that means) as long as it is explanatory. 
The Navier slip condition is lawlike in this sense. And like laws, both the governing equations and 
boundary conditions are law-like in that they are not merely accidental generalizations. Further, if 
slip length does not depend on shear, this regularity is treated as a property of the fluid-solid pair, 
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(Lauga, Brenner, & Stone, 2007, p. 1232) akin to the possession of a material property like density 
or elasticity. The independence of slip length from shear for some fluid-solid pairs is a property of 
those systems, which depends essentially on the existence and qualities of the fluid boundary 
condition. Some influential views of laws, such as Dretske (1977), hold that laws are relations 
among properties, and in such a view the boundary condition would, in this instance, be a part of 
the law in virtue of being part of an important fluid property. Even Outside of such views, it is 
clear from this example that boundary conditions are not playing a role distinct from that of laws 
in the generation and constraining of fluid behavior. 
One distinction that has been drawn between lawlike generalizations and other parts of 
explanation is that laws are stable or invariant, whereas other parts of explanation are highly variant 
and dependent on the particulars of a given situation. Historically, boundary conditions are treated 
as occupying the latter territory. However, while some boundary condition are variant under a wide 
range of interventions, this variance is sometimes overestimated in fluid dynamics, since it is often 
the boundaries themselves and not the boundary conditions that are variant. I discuss the distinction 
between defining boundaries and specifying boundary conditions at more length in later chapters, 
so for now suffice it to say that defining the shape of the boundary is not the same thing as defining 
the boundary conditions. An intervention that changes the shape of the channel through which a 
fluid flows changes the boundary, but not the boundary condition: the new channel shape will still 
be governed by the same slip conditions. This is an important distinction, and one which I believe 
most philosophical writing on boundary conditions has overlooked. In the case of slip in particular, 
it is highly invariant, and that is precisely why it is theoretically useful to the people who employ 
it in their models. 
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Not all boundary conditions are like the Navier slip condition. The slip boundary condition 
is very different from, say, an inlet condition that specifies the flow velocity at some region of a 
pipe. This region is the “beginning” of the flow, where the velocity of the flow must take a certain 
value. This boundary condition will influence the rest of the flow just as much as a wall boundary 
condition like slip. Mathematically, it might appear to have lawlike properties similar to the slip 
boundary condition. But in contrast to the wall boundary condition, this is something that can be 
intervened upon much more easily in practice. In a real system, we can intervene upon this 
boundary condition by, say, increasing the fluid pressure in the pipe, thereby increasing the 
velocity at the beginning of the flow. This is not to say that one cannot intervene upon the slip 
boundary condition. However, intervening on this sort of condition cannot be done directly. Rather 
one would have to change something else about the system, like the material that makes up the 
boundary or by changing the composition of the fluid. And changing the boundary conditions by 
changing the material of the boundary is like changing the parameters that go into the governing 
equations by changing the material the fluid is made of.  
Using an interventionist account of lawlikeness, it is easy to see how boundary conditions 
can figure in explanations in more than merely circumstantial ways. Changes to boundary 
conditions are possible to see in the same way. However, the actual explanatory role of a boundary 
condition in a given explanation must be determined by paying attention to the details of the model. 
Not all boundary conditions have the same degree of invariance under intervention as the slip 
boundary conditions. For instance, consider a fluid flowing through a channel. The flow can be 
determined using the governing equations, boundary conditions, and the shapes of the boundaries 
themselves. In order to describe the flow field, we need boundary conditions besides the ones that 
determine what happens at the solid-fluid interface. For example, we need to know the velocity of 
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the fluid. This sort of boundary condition is often relatively easily intervened upon. We can adjust 
the flow of fluid through a pipe for example. Alternatively, consider the flow of air over a wing. 
We model the velocity of the wing by setting the boundary condition. In these instances, there is a 
lot of variation in the degree of variance under intervention, depending on what sort of boundary 
condition and what sort of explanatory setting is being considered.  
1.3.2  The Scope of Boundary Conditions 
The degree of variance under intervention leads directly to the issue of scope. It might be 
thought that the scope of boundary conditions might be a way to distinguish them from laws. 
Scientific laws tend to have relatively broad scope. It might be claimed that the scope of the 
governing equations, but not the scope of the various boundary conditions, is sufficiently large so 
as to do the explanatory work in causal explanations. Pincock, for instance, suggests that by 
contrast boundary conditions might not be thought of as part of a theory because a theory purports 
to have universal scope over it subject matter. (Pincock, 2011) It does seem to be true that the 
governing equations have a wider scope, since they are used in some form no matter what the fluid 
dynamical problem is. But kinds of limits to the scope of the governing equations are similar the 
kinds of limits of scope on boundary conditions.  
Further, there does not seem to be a principled way of deciding just when a regularity’s 
scope is large enough to count as a law. Recall that the governing equations can take several forms. 
Whether one uses the viscous or non-viscous form depends on what kind of system is being 
modeled. Sometimes this choice involves using a simpler yet less realistic model. For example, 
there are fluids with very low viscosities that can be modeled as if they do not have any viscosity, 
because we can safely neglect the small amount of viscosity they do have. But this is not always 
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the case, since in some cases, there are actually no viscous forces active in the fluid. This is the 
case for superfluids, which have zero viscosity. It is also possible for viscous fluid flows to form 
“inviscid flow arrangements”, which are vortex-like fluid formations such that viscous forces 
vanish. (Runstedler, 2013) Taking another step back, the governing equations of fluid mechanics 
only hold when the continuum approximation holds. (Chen, Wang, & Xia, 2014, p. 114) The 
Knudsen number of a system is the ratio of the molecular mean free path to the system’s 
characteristic length. If a system’s Knudsen number is greater than some threshold (approximately 
1), then the continuum governing equations cannot be used to characterize the system, and 
molecular dynamics must be used instead.  
So the scope of the governing equations is not universal, and is limited by principled 
conditions. This makes the application of the governing equations structurally analogous to the 
application of slip boundary conditions: just as principled types of context determines which form 
of the governing equations to use, so do principled types of context determine which kind of slip 
boundary condition to use. While the scope of the governing equations is generally greater than 
that of boundary conditions, neither has universal scope over its subject matter. The scope of 
respective boundary conditions varies too. The scope of the no-slip condition is considerably 
smaller than the scope of the more general Navier slip condition In any case, though, scope cannot 
be used to generate a categorical distinction between governing equations and boundary 
conditions. 
1.3.3  The Epistemology of Boundary Conditions 
Another apparent difference between the governing equations of fluid mechanics and 
boundary conditions is the theoretical support that the laws of fluid mechanics have. At first, it 
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seems that boundary conditions do not enjoy the same kind of theoretical support that the 
governing equations do. As noted above, these governing equations of fluid mechanics can be 
derived from some basic physical principles of conservation applied to fluid systems. In textbooks, 
there are often chapters devoted to deriving the governing equations from more fundamental 
physical principles, but only a few paragraphs or even a few sentences devoted to introducing 
boundary conditions like the no-slip condition. This might be because knowing which boundary 
conditions to use has historically had less to do with theory, and more to do with empirical 
methods. So while the governing equations had theoretical backing as well as empirical 
confirmation, the correct boundary conditions are phenomena for which there was not well 
established theoretical support. But while it is true that boundary conditions like the no-slip 
condition were developed in a more empirical way than the governing equations, this is a rather 
gross simplification. Evidence for boundary conditions has come via several different avenues, as 
other physical arguments have been made for their applicability.  
The no-slip condition was the subject of controversy in the 18th and 19th centuries. Though 
it was unobservable at a macroscopic level, it played an essential role in predicting macroscopic 
flow quantities. The behavior of fluids directly on the boundary was, and still is, generally hard to 
observationally confirm. Some early evidence for the no-slip condition came from Bernoulli 
(1738) and Coulomb (1800). Bernoulli noticed large discrepancies between results measured for 
real fluids and results he calculated for ideal fluids. He recognized that real fluids could not slip 
freely over the surface of a solid body. Coulomb found that the resistance of a metal disk in a fluid 
was not appreciably altered when the disk was covered in grease (to lower resistance) or when the 
grease was covered with powdered sandstone (to increase resistance). In the 19th century, several 
hypotheses were put forward, without conclusive support for any of them. Gradually, as 
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experimental evidence accumulated, it became generally accepted that in most cases, there is no 
slip at the fluid-solid boundary. (Goldstein, p. 678)  
In addition to experimental investigation, some theoretical arguments were made in support 
of the no-slip condition.3 For example, for geometrically similar systems, non-dimensional 
quantities like force coefficients depend only on Reynolds number, which is the ratio of inertial 
forces to viscous forces. If there were slip, then in addition to characteristic length d, another 
length, l, must be used to specify the thickness of the boundary layer of the fluid. So, when the 
dimensions of the system are manipulated, non-dimensional quantities would depend on l/d as well 
as Reynolds number. So unless l varies in proportion to d, which would be odd, the experimental 
evidence indicates that l is zero.   
Additionally, it was argued that assuming slip would result in strange implications for 
differences in friction between a solid and a fluid, on the one hand, and the between two layers of 
fluid, on the other. Slip would imply that the friction between a fluid and a solid is infinitely less 
than the friction between two layers of fluid. Within a fluid, a shear stress between fluid elements 
produces a deformation, but velocity changes continuously. But slip between a fluid and a solid 
boundary would mean a discontinuity in velocity as you move from the fluid to the solid. 
(Goldstein, pp. 676-680) 
Models of most ordinary fluids assume a no-slip boundary condition, as well as the 
condition that the component of the velocity normal to the wall is also equal to zero. The no-slip 
condition is usually assumed to be valid when the continuum assumption holds and the fluid is 
viscous. Otherwise slip might occur and another boundary condition must be used. For example, 
slip occurs in gas flows in systems with high Knudsen numbers, which have dimensions that are 
                                                 
3 See Goldstein (1938) for a summary of the history of the no-slip condition.  
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on the order of the mean free path of the gas molecules. In such systems, the continuum condition 
no longer holds, and statistical mechanics, rather than fluid dynamics, is the appropriate theory to 
use. Other examples where the no-slip condition should not be used are non-Newtonian fluid 
flows, which have a viscosity that is dependent on stress, and superfluids, which actually have zero 
viscosity. Finally, there are some conditions that allow for slip in fluids which would otherwise 
not display slip. For example, a liquid with a dissolved gas displays slip in some cases, though it 
depends on what the fluid is and what the gas is.  
More recently, a wide variety of experiments are used to investigate slip phenomena. 
Although there is much to be learned about the microscopic conditions at the boundary, the no-
slip condition is considered correct for ordinary viscous flows at the macroscopic scale. There are 
several methods used to detect slip. Indirect methods infer slip length λ by measuring some 
macroscopic quantity and using known equations of fluid mechanics to derive the result. (Cheng 
& Giordano, 2002)That is, any slip is estimated by way of the assumed effect of slip on some other 
macroscopic parameters. For example, recall the relationship between slip and flow rate mentioned 
earlier: 
 
 𝑄𝑄(𝜆𝜆)
𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
= 1 + 4𝜆𝜆
𝑎𝑎
 Equation 3 Flow rate through 
circular pipe 
 
A known pressure drop Δp is applied to a fluid in a small channel, and the resulting flow rate Q is 
measured. The degree to which the a slip boundary condition gives a flow rate Q(λ) that is larger 
than the flow rate for a no-slip flow, QNS. Although such methods are still used, more recently, 
local methods are used to verify the existence of slip directly. For example, the method of particle 
image velocimetry uses small particles as tracers in a flow, and then uses optical methods to 
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measure their velocities and see whether the velocities extrapolate to zero at the boundary. (Pit, 
Hervert, & Leger, 1999)  
There is still much to learn about the behavior of fluid near solid boundaries at smaller 
scales, and more recent investigations of slip have relied on computer simulations that model fluids 
at the molecular scale. And in addition to the historical arguments for the no-slip condition, there 
is more recent trend of justification for the no-slip (and slip) condition: molecular simulations. 
(Koplik & Banavar, 1995) These are computer simulations which model fluids as collections of 
discrete particles, and which use molecular models of the interactions between liquids and solids. 
Generally, for the fluid, these simulations use Newton’s law of motion for single atoms in 
combination with some interaction potential to model the interaction between molecules. And for 
the boundary, a solid is modeled as a lattice, with some spring constant usually added to allow 
momentum transfer from the liquid.  This method of molecular simulations sheds light on how we 
should think of the no-slip condition. The simulation itself is not a fluid dynamical model, so the 
results of such simulations must be interpreted in the continuum limit in order to be of use in fluid 
dynamical models. Here, we are using the (in some sense) more realistic model in order to derive 
information about the less realistic one. But while there are good empirically derived guidelines 
for when the condition applies and good molecular models that describe flows past a boundary at 
the micro scale, the exact mechanism that determines slip is still not totally understood. As the 
next chapter will show, we need to be careful in making inferences about boundary conditions by 
looking at molecular simulations.  
Finally, boundary conditions like slip or no-slip are representational in the sense that they 
represent physical boundaries in the world. Boundary conditions like slip or no-slip along a solid 
surface or a continuous stress and velocity across two fluids with different viscosities both 
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represent physical boundaries in real fluid systems. On the other hand, some boundary conditions 
are not representative of physical boundaries in the world. Boundary conditions like inlet and outlet 
conditions do necessarily represent physical boundaries in the world. Rather, they represent the 
fact that a model must start and end somewhere. 
The upshot of this discussion, and especially of these last points regarding molecular 
simulations and the representational role of boundary conditions, is that boundary conditions can 
live lives just as rich as the governing equations. Not only are they necessary to make a fluid 
mechanical model work, but choosing the right one is not an arbitrary matter. Boundary conditions 
are not just the background conditions in which fluid dynamics is set. Rather, they are an integral 
part of the field. In the case of slip, there is empirical and theoretical support that seriously 
undermines the idea that this boundary condition is an entirely contingent matter of fact.  
The three dimensions of lawlikeness that I have looked at above are not the only features 
of laws.4 They are not wholly independent. Indeed, the scope of a law or boundary condition might 
just be another way of talking about its degree of invariance under intervention. They are not 
wholly dependent on each other either. A given boundary condition might be more lawlike than a 
law according to one measure, and less lawlike according to another, when compared to a given 
law.5 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Mitchell (2000), which looks at the dimensions of stability, strength, and degree of 
abstraction of claims in biology.  
5 Thanks to Porter Williams for pointing out this feature of the account.  
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1.4 Unique Roles for Boundary Conditions in Explanation 
In the previous sections we saw that the difference between boundary conditions and laws 
is sometimes fuzzy. Boundary conditions that are more lawlike provide a much different purpose 
in explanation than boundary conditions that are less lawlike. This is relevant for theories of 
explanation that designate special roles for laws or lawlike statements. In these theories of 
explanation, a boundary condition cannot be prescribed a role simply in virtue of the fact that it is 
a boundary condition. Given the variety of boundary conditions, their particular explanatory roles 
depends on their role in scientific models. We can contrast the way a boundary condition like the 
Navier slip condition might take on a decidedly lawlike role in an explanation with the way a 
boundary condition like an inlet condition might take on the role of a determining condition or 
some particular fact.  
For example, a deductive nomological model of explanation generally distinguishes 
between lawlike and non-lawlike premises. Hempel emphasizes the important role of laws in 
explanation: “the laws connect the explanandum event with the particular conditions cited in the 
explanans, and this is what confers upon the latter the status of explanatory (and, in some cases, 
causal) factors in regard to the phenomenon to be explained.” (Hempel, 1962) Boundary conditions 
like the Navier slip condition do indeed take on the role of laws in a deductive nomological 
explanation. That said, they can take on the role of particular conditions as well. An inlet boundary 
condition that specifies the fluid velocity at a particular region of the flow does this.  
We can look at other theories of explanation, too. For example, take Woodward’s (2003) 
interventionist account. Here, the minimal condition for successful explanation is:  
Suppose that M is an explanandum consisting in the statement that some 
variable Y takes the particular value y. Then an explanans E for M will consist of 
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(a) a generalization G relating changes in the value(s) of a variable X (where X may 
itself be a vector or n-tuple of variables Xi) and changes in Y, and (b) a statement 
(of initial or boundary conditions) that the variable X takes the particular value x. 
A necessary and sufficient condition for E to be (minimally) explanatory with 
respect to M is that (i) E and M be true or approximately so; (ii) according to G, Y 
takes the value y under an intervention in which X takes the value x; (iii) there is 
some intervention that changes the value of X from x to x’ where x≠x’, with G 
correctly describing the value y’ that Y would assume under this intervention, 
where y≠y’. (Woodward, 2003, p. 203) 
Now see how different boundary conditions play different roles under this condition. A boundary 
condition like the Navier slip condition relates shear rate to the amount of slip at the boundary. 
This sort of boundary condition functions like the generalization G. In contrast, a boundary 
condition like an inlet condition functions like a variable X that takes a particular value. It can be 
intervened upon, and via a generalization G (in this case the governing equations), another variable 
(some property of the flow like volume flux) would be changed.  
At first blush it might seem that the difference between boundary conditions and laws is 
just a matter of degree. But while there are certain similarities, boundary conditions have their own 
unique properties as well. These properties allow them to do work that laws cannot. Of course, as 
a matter of mathematical fact, they are simply different sorts of things, and so have different 
functions in scientific models. They put a different kind of constraint on a system than differential 
equations. After all, there is a reason we make a distinction in the first place. They are just different 
sorts of mathematical objects. But their properties also allow for different conceptual roles in 
philosophical accounts. The degree to which a boundary condition is lawlike is not the most 
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important factor in the role of the boundary condition in an explanation. Their mathematical roles 
must be taken into account. And their particular places in fluid mechanical models make a 
difference too.  
The big point I want to make is that the fact that a piece of a model is a boundary condition 
is by itself not a reason to assign it a particular role in an explanation. Instead, as I have shown 
throughout this chapter, boundary conditions play multiple important roles in scientific models 
and the explanations they generate. I believe, further, that boundary conditions also play roles in 
explanation that have not yet been identified in the literature and which cannot be understood 
merely by similarity to or difference from the roles played by laws.   
One way that boundary conditions do unique work in explanation is in the way they 
constrain a system. Wilson (1990) characterizes the situation in terms of internal requirements and 
external requirements that are put on a system. For a given region with a boundary (the region is a 
piece of iron in Wilson’s example), there is a differential equation that tells the system how to 
behave within the region. This equation would seem to place certain requirements on the system 
at the very edge of the region. But there are also external requirements put on the system by the 
boundary. And there is an apparent mismatch between the requirements of the differential equation 
and the requirements of these boundary conditions. Importantly, as Wilson also points out, 
physicists do not always give priority to the internal requirements. The most straightforward way 
of solving these sorts of conflicts is to let the inner requirement approach the outer requirement in 
the limit. When scientists model a material with a boundary, they often have prior knowledge about 
what sorts boundary conditions work for a material. And this knowledge is often independent of 
what we know about the internal requirements.  
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The scenario is similar to cases in fluid dynamics. Recall that while the governing equations 
had been derived from known conservation laws applied to fluid systems, our knowledge of the 
no slip boundary condition comes from a wide range of sources. Besides empirical confirmation, 
there was an argument from simplicity (since slip would seem require an extra parameter that 
depended on distance to the boundary) and molecular simulations. The way these two sorts of 
requirements interact is not a trivial matter. So the role of the boundary condition in explaining 
some feature of the system is not a matter of whether or not the boundary condition acts a covering 
law or play some other logical role. Instead, and following more closely with the treatment of 
boundary conditions in the philosophy of physics discussed above, the explanatory role played by 
boundary conditions in these cases is a product of the mathematical role they play in the systems 
of equations that constitute the fluid mechanical models. As I discuss in the remainder of this 
dissertation, and particularly in Chapters 2 and 3, the mathematical structure of boundary 
conditions is often irreducible to a set of philosophically-imposed structural constraints. 
1.5 Conclusions 
Boundary conditions are an often neglected feature in philosophical accounts of scientific 
explanation, scientific laws, causation, and reductionism. But they are often just as important as 
the equations they constrain. I have explored the role that boundary conditions play in fluid 
mechanical modeling. Understanding how boundary conditions function in actual scientific 
models should guide philosophical understanding of their role in explanation, etc. But since the 
role of the boundary conditions often depends on the details of the model, it is doubtful that a 
 30 
single account will apply in all cases. But the hope is that a more technically correct understanding 
of boundary conditions can be used in discussions of more general issues in philosophy of science.  
Philosophers have gotten their accounts of boundary conditions wrong, because they have 
been working backwards in some sense. They have been trying to fit the behavior of boundary 
conditions into a philosophical account first, before observing boundary conditions in their natural 
habitats in physics. But by looking at them in their natural habitat, we see that they do not always 
fit neatly into a particular philosophical theory. The difference between laws and boundary 
conditions depends on their role in the theory, often defined by their mathematical properties. Their 
role depends on their relationship to differential equations, not their role in explanations.  
Boundary conditions are well defined mathematically, and their relation to differential 
equations is clear. But the fact that something is a boundary condition does not prescribe a 
particular role in a theory of explanation. Their philosophical role is less well defined and heavily 
context dependent. Some boundary conditions are highly variant under intervention, others are 
not. Some are only useful in very particular contexts, others have a scope almost as large as the 
governing equations. Some rely solely on empirical considerations for justification, others receive 
a lot of theoretical support. But this variety does not mean that we cannot assign philosophical 
roles to them; it just means we have to be careful when we do. 
Boundary conditions have not only not gotten their due as explanantia, they have also been 
under appreciated as explananda. Attempts to explain boundary conditions have drawn on both 
top down and bottom up approaches. We already saw that historically explanations for boundary 
conditions have developed in rather piecemeal fashion, with evidence ranging from arguments 
about the length scales needed to characterize a fluid system, to inferences based on other 
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macroscopic fluid properties, to molecular simulations. The exact mechanism for slip and no slip 
conditions is still not well understood. 
I began this chapter by outlining two ways in which philosophers of science have 
historically theorized about boundary conditions. My discussion of the slip boundary conditions 
in fluid dynamics aimed to show how neither of these modes of theorizing are adequate 
frameworks for capturing the varied explanatory roles played by boundary conditions in 
contemporary physical explanations. I have highlighted problems in philosophical understanding 
of the explanatory role of boundary conditions in order to motivate the account of boundary 
conditions that I develop in the chapters that follow. Unlike the philosophers I have argued against, 
I will begin from the boundary conditions first, aiming eventually to understand their role in 
physical and scientific explanation by inquiring after their place in other parts of the landscape of 
philosophy of science. In Chapter 2, I develop a contrast between boundary conditions and 
conditions at the boundary, in order to uncover a distinction that has gone as-yet unnoticed in the 
philosophy of science. In Chapter 3, I consider how the very scale at which boundaries exist in 
physical modeling impacts the epistemic and explanatory roles they can play. And in Chapter 4, I 
use the example of boundary conditions to make an argument for realism. Together, these pieces 
paint an alternate picture of the explanatory roles of boundary conditions. 
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2.0 The Difference between Boundary Conditions and Conditions at the Boundary  
In the previous chapter, I discussed how boundary conditions work in fluid dynamics, 
explored some of their features, and noted how important they are in building scientific models. I 
argued that boundary conditions can play varied roles in scientific explanations. In this chapter I 
will look at a distinction that goes underappreciated or even unnoticed by both philosophers and 
scientists: the distinction between boundary conditions and conditions at the boundary. In contrast 
to boundary conditions, conditions at the boundary explicitly take into account the interactions 
between the fluid and the boundary. This distinction was first described by Howard Brenner and 
Venkat Ganesan (2000) in the context of models of fluid diffusion. They show how a molecular 
description of a fluid near a boundary does not necessarily translate to the correct fluid dynamics 
boundary condition. I will argue that conditions at the boundary are distinguished from boundary 
conditions in virtue of two features: 1) they explicitly describe interactions between the fluid and 
the solid boundary, and in virtue of this fact, 2) they cannot play the constraining roles of boundary 
conditions, as the latter were characterized in Chapter 1.   
First I will explain a conceptual difference between boundary conditions and conditions at 
the boundary. Then I will present Brenner and Ganesan’s case for making the distinction, where 
they show how the conditions at the boundary described by a molecular model do not correctly 
predict the boundary conditions of a corresponding continuum model. They make the distinction 
in terms of the difference between fluid dynamics and molecular dynamics, where the former 
accompany boundary conditions and the latter accompany conditions at the boundary. I will argue, 
contra Brenner and Ganesan, that this is not the important feature of the distinction. Rather, the 
important part of distinguishing boundary conditions from conditions at the boundary is the way 
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the two parts of scientific models take into account the interactions between fluid and boundary. 
As evidence, I will show that we can describe conditions at the boundary using continuum 
modeling, and we can describe boundary conditions using molecular modeling. There are 
constraints out on molecular dynamics systems that are boundary conditions, and there are 
conditions at the boundary in fluid dynamics. So the distinction between boundary conditions, on 
the one hands, and conditions at the boundary, on the other, is best made in terms of whether or 
not boundary interactions with fluid are explicitly taken into account.  
The distinction has important consequences for philosophical accounts of scientific 
explanation and intertheory relations, as well as being important to the construction of scientific 
models. I will argue that boundary conditions and conditions at the boundary occupy different 
explanatory contexts. They play different roles in explanation because they have different 
explanatory targets. The explanatory shift is a result of the content of the condition at the boundary 
rather than its form. This is particularly relevant for issues surrounding intertheory relations. Given 
the difference between boundary conditions and conditions at the boundary, we must be careful 
when making inferences about the former based on the latter.  
2.1 A Conceptual Difference  
Before we look at the difference, we must clear up the way we are using the respective 
concepts. Right away, we can identify a conceptual difference between boundary conditions and 
conditions at the boundary. In a mathematical context, a boundary defines the area in which a 
differential equation operates. A set of differential equations and boundary conditions constitutes 
a boundary value problem, the solution to which must satisfy the boundary conditions. In this 
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context, a boundary condition is a mathematical entity with a specific mathematical function in a 
system of equations. For example, they can prescribe the value of unknowns on the boundary 
(Dirichlet boundary condition), specify the normal gradient of the unknowns (Neumann boundary 
conditions), or specify a combination of unknown quantities and their normal gradients (mixed 
boundary condition). (Massoudi, 2007) These systems of equations including boundary conditions 
are used in fluid dynamics to represent fluid flows. In fluid dynamics and physics generally, 
boundary conditions are indispensable parts of models. Recall some of the examples from the 
previous chapter, like liquid flowing through a channel or air flowing past an airfoil. The same set 
of governing equations are used to build models of very different looking flows. The difference in 
these flows depends differences in boundary conditions, alongside differences in the configuration 
of the boundaries themselves, and sometimes differences initial conditions. A set of boundary 
conditions in a flow model might represent how a fluid behaves at a physical boundary like a solid 
wall. The no-slip boundary condition, which requires that fluid at the boundary has zero velocity 
relative to the boundary, is an example of this. Boundary conditions can also define other parts of 
the flow as well, like an inlet condition of constant flow velocity into the system, where there is 
no corresponding physical boundary.  
In contrast to a boundary condition, a condition at the boundary is a less well-defined 
concept. At first approximation, conditions at the boundary are what happens at or near the 
boundary of a physical system in the actual world. For our purposes, a boundary in this sense is 
the interface between a solid and a fluid. A condition at the boundary can be the temperature of 
the fluid near the boundary, or the movements of individual atoms in this region, or transfer of 
momentum between the solid and the fluid, or dielectric differences between the fluid and the 
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solid, or so on. Conditions at the boundary include the region near the boundary, but they may also 
include the boundary itself.  
There is at first an obvious difference between boundary conditions and conditions at the 
boundary in virtue of the kinds of things they are. As I’ve described them above, a boundary 
condition is a mathematical object, while a condition at the boundary is a part of the actual world. 
That is, there is a difference in ontological kind, and it would be a category mistake to use them 
interchangeably. One concept applies to the world; the other applies to mathematically defined 
models. But this ontological difference is not the interesting distinction that I am trying to define. 
In order to see the distinction I am after, we have to be able to make the two concepts 
commensurable. To do that, we need to be able to choose one context, either the world or models, 
and talk about both concepts in that context. For this discussion, it will be easier to work in the 
context of models. Boundary conditions, being parts of a model, can be used to represent the world. 
In the same way that other equations which define a fluid model represent the world, so can 
boundary conditions. Likewise, features of the world can be represented in a model, and are often 
represented by pieces of mathematics. In this way, condition at the boundary, being features of the 
world, can also be parts of models. So conditions at the boundary can be represented in a model, 
and we can compare these concepts in meaningful ways. We can also compare the features of the 
world that these two concepts represent. Most of what follows has to do with scientific models. So 
unless specified otherwise, I will assume that both boundary conditions and conditions at the 
boundary are features of models. But we should keep in mind that all of these models represent 
the world.  
Now that we can compare the two concepts in the context of a model, we can begin to see 
that they have different properties. Even though a condition at the boundary is now part of a model, 
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it is not the same thing as a boundary condition. For one thing, a condition at the boundary can be 
modeled using whatever theoretical apparatus is appropriate. For a fluid and a solid boundary, the 
theoretical apparatus is often a molecular dynamics model. Even if it were to be described in terms 
of fluid dynamics, we should not assume that it is a boundary condition, since a mere description 
is not a boundary condition unless it plays the specific mathematical role mentioned above. For 
example, we might give a description of the conditions at the boundary such that a fluid has zero 
velocity. But this is not the same thing as the no slip boundary condition. In a sense, they are both 
descriptions, but boundary conditions have additional mathematical infrastructure, and additional 
constraints, built into them. A boundary condition stands in a particular relationship to a system of 
equations, and so plays a particular role in a fluid model. In contrast, a condition at the boundary 
only needs to describe part of a flow; it does not need to constrain the rest of the flow the way a 
boundary condition does.  
One way to see the difference is to look at the Navier slip condition itself: 
 
 
𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 = 𝜆𝜆 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑠𝑠 Equation 4 Navier slip condition 
 
We can think of the fluid velocity at the boundary, us, as a condition at the boundary. In the last 
chapter, I argued that boundary conditions have a more lawlike character than is often 
acknowledged. This boundary condition will hold in a wide variety of conditions. It becomes more 
specific when a slip length λ is specified. If other flow conditions are intervened upon, then the 
conditions at the boundary will change, even though the Navier slip condition still holds. The 
boundary condition is a generalization that holds, while the condition at the boundary is a result of 
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the application of that generalization. Since its function is to constrain solutions to differential 
equations, the way it represents the world is significantly different from conditions at the boundary.  
So even if we make these concepts commensurable, a conceptual difference remains. But 
the difference between boundary conditions and conditions at the boundary goes even further this 
conceptual difference. As I will show in the next section, there is difference not just in the role, 
but in the content of the boundary conditions and conditions at the boundary.  
2.2 A Difference in Content 
When modeling fluids at the macroscopic scale, it is often sufficient to assume a no-slip 
condition. But if we are interested in modeling the smaller-scale behavior of the fluid, there is 
limited evidence from which to draw. For a long time, experiments relied only on inferences made 
from other macroscopic observables. Only relatively recently have direct detection techniques 
been used in slip experiments. There are difficulties in using either of these available experimental 
strategies to detect the degree of small scale slip. (Lauga, Brenner, & Stone, 2007)  
Recently, computer simulations have become an increasingly powerful tool to examine 
fluids at the molecular scale. These molecular-scale simulations can give insight into unsolved 
questions in boundary phenomena in fluid dynamics. There are still open questions about the 
microscopic behavior of a fluid at a boundary and how this behavior translates to macroscopic 
behavior, but there are ways of making these two pictures, the continuous fluid and the discrete 
molecular, talk to each other. Roughly, in a molecular model, the mean molecular motion at a 
given distance y from the boundary can be averaged. If this value equals zero at y=0, then 
intuitively we can say that there is no slip at the boundary. We can define any amount of slip 
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greater than zero in an analogous manner. This ability to link a molecular model with a continuum 
model gives the impression that we can take the boundary condition of the continuum model as an 
accurate description of the fluid at the boundary. In some cases, it might be an accurate description. 
For example, the no slip condition typically holds for a viscous flow past a boundary, and a 
molecular model typically models the mean molecular motion as approaching zero at the wall. 
Using these sorts of connecting principles, there have been numerous attempts to predict and 
explain slip phenomena using molecular dynamics. (Thompson & Robbins, 1990; Barrat & 
Bocquet, 1999; Koplik & Banavar, 1998; Koplik & Banavar, 1995)  
In response to these sorts of investigations, Brenner and Ganesan (2000) have presented an 
argument that it is not correct to use molecular dynamics to draw conclusions about the fluid 
dynamics that describe fluids at the continuum scale, using their distinction between boundary 
conditions and conditions at the boundary. The conceptual distinction between boundary 
conditions and conditions at the boundary becomes evident when the conditions at the boundary 
are described using tools of molecular dynamics simulations. When a matching procedure is used 
to try to turn this description into a boundary condition, it describes a lack of slip for the fluid at 
the boundary. However when one tries to apply Fick’s law (discussed in more detail below), which 
is given in terms of fluid dynamics, to the same system, a slip condition is required. The result is 
that there is no clear translation procedure to derive a fluid dynamical boundary condition from a 
given set of conditions at the boundary. Moreover, the two likely candidates to do the translating 
offer conflicting suggestions about the character of the boundary condition that could result.  
These models, the molecular dynamics model and the fluid dynamics model, both have a 
high degree of experimental and theoretical support. Yet when we treat the conditions at the 
boundary as boundary conditions, we run into an inconsistency. Specifically, the no slip boundary 
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condition should not be used in the continuum model, even though the molecular simulation model 
seems to call for it. The conclusion is that slip lengths should not be regarded as accurate 
representations of the conditions at the boundary, nor should the molecular conditions at the 
boundary be used to determine boundary conditions. Even if the no slip condition can be derived 
from a molecular simulation, it need not (and in some cases should not) apply to the continuum 
equations that govern the flow on the macroscopic scale.   
Looking more closely at Brenner and Ganesan’s argument, we consider a fluid next to a 
solid boundary. There are two main length scales. On the one hand there is the molecular length 
scale l that characterizes both the scale of the fluid-fluid (f-f) interactions between the fluid 
molecules and the solid-fluid (s-f) interactions between the fluid molecules and the molecules of 
the solid boundary. These f-f lengths and s-f lengths are usually similar in magnitude, and so 
usually the same length scale l applies to both. On the other hand, there is the macroscopic length 
scale, L. This length scale is determined by the size of the apparatus being modeled. Typically, 
this length scale is defined by the distance between two planar walls that bound the fluid, or the 
radius of a channel through which the fluid flows. A molecular model must take into account the 
f-f and s-f length scales and the apparatus length scale L. However, due to computational 
limitations, current molecular models are limited to those for which L is on the same order of 
magnitude as l. So if modelers want to model a system more than a few intermolecular length 
scales in size, they must rely on continuum models.  
Continuum models, by contrast, are built using governing equations that take into account 
the f-f forces, but not the s-f forces. The closer we get to a solid boundary, the more important the 
s-f forces become. Eventually, they cannot be ignored, and this is where boundary conditions like 
the no-slip condition are employed. As Brenner and Ganesan put it, “no single L-scale boundary 
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condition can ever fully compensate for the loss of detailed l-scale physical molecular information 
about the s-f (or possible even the s-s) interactions implicit in such a coarse-scale description.” 
(Brenner & Ganesan, 2000, p. 6881) In other words, the fluid dynamics that operate at the 
continuum scale simply do not have a way of accounting for the s-f forces described by the 
molecular model.  
Brenner and Ganesan go on to describe a two dimensional fluid system that consists of a 
solute which diffuses down a concentration gradient in a solvent. The fluid is bounded by solid 
surfaces on the top and bottom of the diffusion cell. These are the surfaces where either a slip or 
no-slip boundary condition will hold. Meanwhile, the two side boundaries are solute reservoirs 
that supply their own boundary condition, namely that uniform solute concentrations are 
maintained at those boundaries. This maintains a constant concentration gradient which drives the 
diffusion, as molecules of solute move from high concentration to low concentration. The lengths 
of the boundaries determine the L length scale. We can then model the diffusive transport of the 
solute in two different ways. One is a continuum model that uses the assumptions of fluid 
mechanics. The other is a molecular model that posits Brownian particles that represent the solute 
molecules. Due to limits in computational power, the molecular model is only used to describe the 
region very close to the solid boundary.  
The continuum description of the flow yields Fick’s law of diffusion, which describes the 
diffusive flux (the amount of fluid that flows through a unit area in a unit time) in relation to 
concentration. Fick’s law states that:  
 
 
𝐽𝐽 = −𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕
 Equation 5 Fick’s law 
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where J is the diffusion flux, which is the amount of substance that flows through a unit area in a 
unit time, D is the diffusion coefficient, φ is concentration, and x is position. It is important to note 
that the diffusion coefficient D is position independent. In order for the equations to correctly 
model the diffusion, they need to be constrained by certain boundary conditions that maintain a 
concentration gradient. Crucially, in order for Fick’s law to correctly describe diffusive flux, the 
no slip condition does not hold. If it did hold, the result would be a conflict with the other boundary 
conditions that maintained the gradient.  
The molecular model considers the transport of Brownian particles near a smooth solid 
boundary. The molecular motion is generated using a Langevin equation, which describes the 
stochastic motion of Brownian particles. The model produces a probability field which then 
corresponds to a density concentration field. This simulation using the molecular model yields a 
“no flux” condition at the boundary. That is, there is no fluid movement at the boundary. But note 
that this is not a boundary condition; it is a consequence of the molecular wall effects that fall out 
of the physics of the molecular simulation. The flow field in this lower level model has the property 
that both the normal and tangential (i.e. slip) components of the flow go to zero at the wall. This 
is the key result of the molecular model.  
The crux of the discussion is this: while the continuum model requires a slip boundary 
condition, the molecular model tells us that the fluid at the wall does not slip. So if you were to try 
to derive boundary conditions from conditions at the boundary of the molecular simulations, you 
would not get the right boundary conditions needed to make the continuum equations work. Using 
this result, Brenner and Ganesan conclude that the boundary conditions imposed on the macroscale 
model cannot be derived by taking the conditions at the boundary that emerged from of the lower 
level model and interpreting them as boundary conditions. Lauga, Brenner, and Stone summarize, 
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“slip lengths should not be measured literally at the molecular scale but arise as the extrapolation, 
at the boundaries, of the far field hydrodynamic results.” (Lauga, Brenner, & Stone, 2007, p. 1228) 
Brenner and Ganesan go on to use a singular perturbation analysis to arrive at a solution 
that is a composite of the microscale and macroscale solutions, composed of the microscale, or 
inner, solution and the macroscale, or outer, solution. The solution describes a singular layer near 
the wall, where Fick’s law is not valid. The boundary condition used on the macroscale equations 
was derived by matching the inner and outer solutions. So rather them imposing the condition 
derived from the molecular model, the outer limits of the inner solution are the boundary conditions 
that we must use on the Fick’s law equation. As Brenner and Ganesan put it, “it is precisely because 
this boundary condition is an asymptotic matching condition, rather than a literal condition 
prevailing at the actual physical solid-fluid boundary, that current molecular dynamics simulations 
furnish conditions at a boundary that are generally inconsistent with conventional continuum-
mechanical boundary conditions.” (2000, p. 6881) 
The sort of issue that Brenner and Ganesan highlight in this diffusion case is not unique to 
that particular case, or to diffusion more generally. Flow near contact lines is another place where 
there is apparent conflict between the boundary condition and the conditions at the boundary.6 
Consider two immiscible fluids that are in contact with each other and with a solid surface. The 
line that forms the boundary between the two fluids is called the contact line, and it forms a contact 
angle with the solid. The two fluids can both be liquids of they could be a liquid and a gas. Think 
of a drop of water sitting on a solid surface. We observe the contact line move if more liquid is 
added to the drop, causing it to spread out, or if it is subjected to a force, as it would if it were on 
                                                 
6 This type of situation is of increasing practical interest, as it describes the conditions needed for vapor-
liquid-solid growth methods of growing metal nanorods. Thanks to Julia Bursten for pointing this out.  
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an inclined surface and gravity pulled it down across the surface. The continuum description of 
moving contact lines must employ a slip boundary condition in order to match observations and 
avoid singularities that cannot be integrated over. Molecular simulations of moving contact lines 
has been unable to explain the boundary condition necessary to avoid this.  
Since the Brenner and Ganesan article, there has been continued discussion regarding the 
use of molecular models to determine boundary conditions. For example, Denniston and Robbins 
(2001) have been able to use molecular models of convective-diffusive flows, in which diffusive 
flow is either dominant or on the same scale as convective flow, to produce flows consistent with 
Fick’s law within one molecular diameter from the boundary. Despite this, Brenner and Ganesan’s 
main philosophical point remains, namely that molecular dynamics explicitly takes into account 
fluid-solid interactions in a way that the boundary conditions of fluid dynamics cannot by 
themselves. This does not mean that we will never be able to use conditions at the boundary to 
explain boundary conditions. But it does mean that we must always take care when using 
conditions at the boundary to make inferences about boundary conditions.  
The difference between boundary conditions and conditions at the boundary has concrete 
consequences for scientists who model fluid systems. Practically, in the course of modelling fluids, 
context will determine the best model to use. Whether modelers are interested in the fluid-solid 
interface for its own sake, or in the overall shape of the flow, often determines whether they use a 
molecular model or a continuum model. But there are contexts in which they need to pay attention 
to both. The smaller the system, the more the molecular conditions at the boundary matter. For 
instance, if modelers want to model a flow through a capillary with a radius on the order of tens 
of nanometers, then the conditions at the boundary will take up a larger proportion of the flow. So 
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it is sometimes important to not only get the boundary conditions that will describe the bulk flow 
correctly, but also to get the right conditions at the boundary.  
When talking about experiments, scientists often seem to conflate boundary conditions and 
conditions at the boundary. Experiments used to investigate fluid flows near the boundary are often 
described in term of boundary conditions only. But the distinction is tacitly acknowledged when 
discussing results. For example, when a slip boundary condition is found to be appropriate, 
experimenters try to distinguish between microscopic slip that only happens at the scale of 
individual molecules, macroscale slip that is detectable at the continuum scale, and apparent slip. 
(Lauga, Brenner, & Stone, 2007) 
2.2.1  Apparent Slip  
Before I go any further, I need to comment on apparent slip. Apparent slip is when a slip 
boundary condition is the correct boundary condition to use in a model of a flow, even though the 
fluid at the surface satisfies the no slip condition. (Lauga, Brenner, & Stone, Microfluidics: The 
No-Slip Boudary Condition, p. 1229) This is usually because the region in which the no-slip 
condition holds is so small that it can be neglected when modeling macroscopic systems. In such 
cases, there is usually a layer of some other fluid, often a gas, between a fluid and a solid boundary. 
There are other known conditions that might cause apparent slip, such as heating that changes the 
viscosity of the fluid near the boundary or electrically charged fluids. But typically, an upper layer 
of fluid is moving over another fluid layer of lower viscosity, instead of the upper fluid itself 
slipping past the boundary. Stress must be continuous at the boundary between a liquid and a gas. 
And a difference in viscosities produces a difference of strain rates. But since the layer of gas is 
small, its shear rate is not used to estimate slip. Instead the shear rate of the upper layer fluid is 
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extrapolated all the way to the boundary surface. In modelling such flows, unless modelers are 
interested in the microscopic conditions near the boundary, a slip boundary condition is the often 
the best condition to use, since it will better represent the overall flow. If they were to try to model 
the thin layer of fluid, then a no slip boundary condition would have to be used for this boundary, 
and they would have to treat the boundary between the two fluids separately. This would require 
its own boundary condition. But in cases where they are not concerned with the thin layer, they 
can safely model the flow as if the upper fluid is just slipping past the boundary.   
At first, it might seem like apparent slip is an example of the distinction I am trying to 
define. That is, it might seem like I am calling the no-slip region the “condition at the boundary”, 
while I am calling the apparent slip region the “boundary condition.” If this were the case, then it 
does seem like the boundary condition is not the same as the conditions at the boundary. It seems 
like we are using a slip boundary condition while the condition at the boundary is actually a zero 
velocity. But this is not the distinction I want to make. In cases of apparent slip, there is another 
boundary condition that is being suppressed for the sake of simplicity. This is not really the 
difference between a boundary condition and a condition at the boundary, but rather the difference 
between two boundary conditions. Instead of defining two boundary conditions (one at the 
boundary between the two fluids and one at the boundary between the bottom layer of fluid and 
the solid boundary), we have just defined one. Even if we know that the bottom layer of fluid 
should be constrained by the no slip condition, this is still a boundary condition and not a condition 
at the boundary.  
However, the treatment of apparent slip does indicate that a boundary condition’s primary 
role is constraining differential equations, not describing the boundary. Unlike cases of apparent 
slip, Brenner and Ganesan’s example does not depend on layer of another fluid or other sources of 
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apparent slip, like heating that changes the viscosity of the fluid near the boundary. It is all a model 
of a single homogenous fluid. Their example comes only from comparing the molecular simulation 
and the continuum model of the same fluid.  
2.3 Separating Differences in Theory and Scale from the Difference between Boundary 
Conditions and Conditions at the Boundary 
Brenner and Ganesan have presented the distinction between boundary conditions and 
conditions at the boundary in terms of fluid dynamics and molecular dynamics. They attribute the 
distinction to the macroscopic length scale present in the fluid dynamics but not the molecular 
dynamics. While they recognize that conditions at the boundary are characterized by the way they 
take into account interactions between the fluid and the solid, they do not distinguish this from the 
molecular model itself, or from the microscopic length scale. In this section, I will show how the 
distinction they make is not tied essentially to a particular model or a particular length scale. Not 
only do boundary conditions show up at the molecular scale, but conditions at the boundary show 
up at the continuum scale.  
First, I will look at molecular models of boundary conditions that do not explicitly take 
into account the interactions between the fluid and the boundary. It is common for molecular 
dynamics simulations to build the solid boundary in the same way they build the fluid. They model 
both the fluid and the solid as discrete atoms or molecules that interact according to some 
interaction potential. While the fluid molecules are free to move around, the molecules that make 
up the solid are fixed to a lattice. This is not the only way to make a molecular dynamics model of 
a fluid near a solid boundary. Some molecular models do not build the boundary out of molecules. 
 47 
Rather, they impose boundary conditions, which specify the motion of the molecules as they 
approach the wall. This is typically done using an accommodation coefficient, which is a way to 
quantify the behavior of fluid particles when they collide with a boundary. (Karniadakis, Beskok, 
& Aluru, 2005, p. 62) The tangential momentum accommodation coefficient σv is defined as:  
 
 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣 = 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏𝑟𝑟𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖  Equation 6 Tangential momentum accommodation 
coefficient 
 
where τi is the tangential momentum of incoming molecules and τr is the tangential momentum of 
the reflected molecules. When σv = 0, there is completely specular reflection; the tangential 
velocity of the molecules stays the same, but the normal velocity is reversed. When σv = 1, there 
is completely diffuse reflection; the average tangential velocity of the molecules is zero. Other 
boundary conditions are a bounce-back reflection condition, in which both the tangential and the 
normal velocity components are reversed, and a Maxwellian reflection, in which reflected 
molecules follow a Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution that centers on the boundary velocity.    
 The important thing to see here is that the accommodation coefficient acts as a boundary 
condition. In contrast to the models that model the interactions via some interaction potential 
between the fluid molecules and the solid molecules, the information about the interactions are 
encoded in the accommodation coefficient. So we have boundary condition behavior in a 
molecular dynamics system.  
In the other direction, there are also conditions at the boundary that take place at the scale 
of fluid dynamics. We can quantify wetting behavior of liquids on solid surfaces. Wetting is the 
ability of a liquid to stay in contact with a solid surface, resulting from the physicochemical 
properties of both the liquid and the solid. Wetting properties tell us about the two materials 
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interact. Here the interactions between the fluid and the solid are in terms of the respective 
materials’ surface energies. For a liquid on a flat solid surface, the spreading coefficient S is:  
 
 𝑆𝑆 = 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁 − 𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁 Equation 7 Spreading coefficient 
 
where γS is the solid surface energy, γ is the liquid surface energy, and γLS is the liquid solid 
interfacial energy. If S>0, then the solid is said to be completely wetted as the liquid spreads 
spontaneously, and if S<0, the surface is only partially wetted. In the case of partial wetting, a 
droplet of the liquid forms. Its shape is then characterized by a contact angle, which is the angle 
the liquid drop creates with the solid. The contact angle θc is given by Young’s law:  
 
 𝛾𝛾 cos 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐 = 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁 − 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁 Equation 8 Young’s law 
 
Again, γS is the solid surface energy, γ is the liquid surface energy, and γLS is the liquid solid 
interfacial energy. Contact angles tell us about the interaction between fluid and solid in a way that 
is related to slip. While there is no contact angle in a fluid flow, since contact angles are measured 
when a fluid drop is stationary, it represents a property of the fluid-solid pair. This is an example 
of conditions at the boundary present at the continuum scale fluid dynamics. It has been found that 
slip depends, to some degree and in some cases, on the wetting properties of a fluid on a solid. 
 In these cases, we are still in the domain of fluid mechanics, and thinking of fluids in terms 
of continuum mechanics. Yet according to the distinction we have made, spreading coefficients 
and contact are conditions at the boundary, not boundary conditions, because they are explicitly 
taking into account interactions between the boundary and the fluid. Of course they cannot take 
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into account the molecular interactions explicitly; molecules are just not part of the model, and 
wetting is simply not a molecular phenomenon. The wetting properties of a fluid and solid pair are 
not themselves boundary conditions, but they do correlate with boundary conditions. And like 
molecular conditions at the boundary we must be careful when making inferences to the correct 
boundary conditions. The interactions between these surface energies are related to boundary 
conditions, but are not themselves boundary conditions. 
The upshot of this section is that the distinction that Brenner and Ganesan made does not 
depend on the theory or the scale being used to model the boundary. It is just that they explicitly 
take into account interactions between the fluid and the solid. This changes the explanatory 
context, which then allows them to play some explanatory roles, but prevents them from playing 
others.   
2.4 The Explanatory Roles of Conditions at the Boundary 
Conditions at the boundary take into account information about the boundary that boundary 
conditions do not. This allows them to play certain explanatory roles that boundary conditions 
cannot. It also means that conditions at the boundary cannot play certain roles that are played by 
boundary conditions, some of which I discussed in Chapter 1. These two components of models 
of systems with boundaries play different roles in explanation. This is not because either 
component occupies a particular role in an explanatory schema. Instead, it is because of the 
different roles they play in models and the relations they stand in with the rest of the parts of the 
model.  
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On the one hand, conditions at the boundary can provide explanations or rationales for 
boundary conditions. In the discussion above, I have highlighted cases when conditions at the 
boundary do not do this, in order to drive home the distinction. Nevertheless, studying the behavior 
of conditions at the boundary might help modelers make sense of the use of particular boundary 
conditions. Indeed, the investigations to which Brenner and Ganesan are responding is designed 
to do just that.  
On the other hand, though, conditions at the boundary are not made to stand in the sorts of 
relations with the governing equations of fluid dynamics that boundary conditions do. Conditions 
at the boundary are the result of the interaction of fluid and boundary behavior. I argued in Chapter 
1 that boundary conditions can stand in lawlike relations or be used as lawlike generalizations to 
constrain the solutions to the equations that describe a fluid system. Conditions at the boundary 
simply are not the kinds of things that can stand in such relations. Rather, as I have developed them 
here in the case of scientific modeling, conditions at the boundary arise as the consequences of 
applying lawlike generalizations to a molecular system. Under intervention on a fluid system, the 
conditions at the boundary are highly variant. They are a description of a system that results from 
applying lawlike generalizations, like Lennard-Jones interactions and steric wall interactions, to a 
molecular system. This is similar to a description of a fluid flow resulting from the application of 
the governing equations plus boundary conditions to a fluid system. Conditions at the boundary 
provide knowledge about what happens at the boundary, but they do not have the lawlike character 
of boundary conditions.  
As highly contingent and context-sensitive features of a system, conditions at the boundary 
have more in common with accidental generalizations than lawlike generalizations. Boundary 
conditions are lawlike (at least in some ways) parts of solutions to boundary value problems. In 
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the diffusion example from Brenner and Ganesan, the boundary condition has some lawlike 
features. It displays these in conjunction with the laws governing a fluid system, in this case, Fick’s 
law of diffusion. Conversely, the conditions at the boundary are the result of applying lawlike 
principles that describe the interactions between pairs of molecules. They are explained in terms 
of these principles along with the particular facts derived in the model. 
A final point on how conditions at the boundary compare with boundary conditions in 
terms of evidential bases will close out this section. As a particular type of mathematical object, 
boundary conditions stand in a necessarily distinct kind of relationship to evidence than conditions 
at the boundary. Physical behavior of a particular sort might be evidence for the application of one 
boundary condition over another. For instance, a high viscosity flow will be evidence for the 
appropriateness of using the no-slip boundary condition. However, physical behavior will always 
be evidence of a particular set of conditions at the boundary.7 Nonetheless, there is not a clear line 
that distinguishes evidence for the application of a particular boundary condition from evidence of 
conditions at the boundary. The same observed physical behavior may offer evidence, or provide 
a rationale, for one or both type of condition.  
Despite their differences, there is considerable overlap in the kinds of evidence that are 
gathered for each. There are, however, some tendencies in the ways each are confirmed. 
Experiments that infer the existence of slip from other macroscopic parameters speak to boundary 
conditions, but not to conditions at the boundary. As we have seen from our example, molecular 
simulations tell us about conditions at the boundary, but not necessarily boundary conditions. 
These models are then compared to other experiments that measure (instead of infer) fluid velocity 
as close to the boundary as possible. Experiments that use tracer particles, the closest way of 
                                                 
7 Thanks to Julia Bursten for pointing out this distinction.  
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measuring slip directly, potentially gives us information regarding both boundary conditions and 
conditions at the boundary. This serves to reinforce the initial discussion point in this section, 
which is that conditions at the boundary, in some cases anyway, might explain why a particular 
boundary condition is correct. 
2.5 Reduction and Intertheory Relations 
In addition to the general philosophical considerations I mentioned above, the distinction 
between boundary conditions and conditions at the boundary is relevant to intertheory relations 
generally, and to the question of reduction in particular. While I have just shown how they are 
distinct concepts, they are obviously related. And since our example included a molecular model 
and continuum model, old questions about theory reduction are raised. Basically, we have a macro 
level phenomenon that cannot yet be explained in terms of a micro level phenomenon. Even if we 
agree that in some sense fluid dynamics depends on the underlying molecular nature of fluids, it 
is not clear how those molecular facts produce the boundary conditions that we know should be 
used in fluid dynamics. The situation looks more complex than either a straightforward reduction 
or antireductionist account, especially given the ongoing research into slip boundary conditions. 
But the conceptual difference between the two concepts seems to remain, regardless of what 
molecular models will end up explaining.  
There is an obvious antireductionist undertone in Brenner and Ganesan’s example. We 
cannot derive the “upper level” fluid dynamics boundary condition from the “lower level” 
molecular model. In terms of explanation, molecular dynamics does not explain the fluid 
dynamics. However, a reductionist response might appeal to the incomplete nature of the theories 
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involved. The mechanism of boundary conditions is still not well understood, but we do know that 
in some sense, fluid mechanics relies on the underlying molecular nature of fluids. Surely, the 
reductionist says, advances in our understanding will allow future models to capture the fluid 
dynamics entirely. Brenner and Ganesan themselves start to say things in this direction. They point 
out that there is good evidence that the molecular model is a fairly accurate representation of what 
is happening at the boundary. Echoing certain sentiments found in the reductionism literature, they 
say “were such simulations ever to reach the stage where they were computationally capable of 
dealing with the l/L << 1 case, rather than being limited to the l/L = O(1) case, the potential 
inconsistency would presumably disappear. In such circumstances, in order to capture the 
underlying physics (albeit “far” from boundaries in terms of the length scale l), one would no 
longer require the conventional f-f macroscale boundary conditions.” In other words, we could in 
principle dispense with a fluid dynamics model, and instead describe the entire system using the 
more accurate molecular model. 
These sorts of “in principle” appeals show up in the philosophical literature.8 And while 
the merits of these appeals can be debated, perhaps a more powerful argument can be found in 
current experimental practice, some of which does seem aimed at the explanation of boundary 
conditions in terms of molecular models. It is also the case that the governing equations of fluid 
mechanics implicitly only take into account the f-f forces. They do not take into account the s-f 
forces, either explicitly or implicitly. So by their very nature, the conditions at the boundary are 
external requirements that cannot be fully captured by the fluid dynamics. So taking a boundary 
condition expressed in terms of fluid dynamics to also be a literal description of the conditions at 
                                                 
8 See for example Norton (2012) and Butterfield (2011) 
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the boundary would be to take “too seriously”9 the continuum model like the one based on Fick’s 
laws.  
But the fact is that today fluid dynamics models are required to explain the properties of 
fluids. For their part, despite their initial reductionist sentiments, Brenner and Ganesan admit: 
“However, that day appears to lie far in the future. And even then, it is difficult to imagine a 
scenario in which continuum mechanics would no longer prove useful for at least qualitatively 
interpreting the gross behavior of complex fluid-mechanical phenomena.” (p. 6881) But it is also 
possible that even if such a day comes, there will be explanations that depend essentially on the 
fluid dynamics models 
To illustrate the challenge posed to reduction by the difference between boundary 
conditions and conditions at the boundary, I am going to return to a familiar theme: shear and slip. 
In a typical molecular dynamics model, the solid boundary is modeled as a set of fixed lattice 
points. The molecular model used to describe conditions at the boundary makes assumptions about 
the solid wall, necessary to capture s-f interactions. By contrast, in a boundary condition on a flow, 
all of the information about the boundary behavior is encoded in its effects on the fluid, which are 
represented using a single parameter, namely slip length. Slip behavior depends on a number of 
factors such as shear rate, wetting conditions, pressure, surface charge, surface roughness, and 
dissolved gas. (Lauga, Brenner, & Stone, p. 1234) If, on the other hand, we are engineering a pipe 
to produce a particular type of slip in the fluid it will channel, we might adjust the pipe’s material 
and surface conditions to manipulate wetting conditions, pressure, surface charge, or so on. 
Sometimes, the single-parameter boundary condition is all we need; other times, a more robust 
                                                 
9 In the sense of Callender (2001).  
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picture of the conditions at the boundary is necessary. One is simply not shorthand for the other. 
Instead, they occupy different but sometimes overlapping explanatory contexts. 
To make the point in a more concrete context, recall that physicists distinguish between 
different kinds of slip. There is microscopic slip, which happens at the scale of individual 
molecules. There is actual continuum slip at a liquid-solid boundary. And there is apparent slip, 
due to motion of homogeneous boundaries. (Lauga, Brenner, & Stone, p. 1234) 
Recall that the Navier slip condition is related to the shear rate at the boundary: 
 
 
𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 = 𝜆𝜆 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑠𝑠 Equation 9 Navier slip condition 
 
So even if we can identify the flow velocity with a molecular dynamics description, the actual 
velocity at the boundary depends on shear rate, which itself depends on the details of rest of the 
flow. To make matters more complicated, in some cases, it is not always just the fluid velocity (us) 
that depends on the shear rate. Experiment indicates that sometimes the slip length parameter (λ) 
itself depends on the shear rate, and the slip boundary condition becomes nonlinear.    
The Navier slip condition is like the governing equations in this way. The equations 
themselves are quite general and need inputs in order to describe an actual system. Consider the 
momentum equation for incompressible fluid of constant velocity:  
 
 
𝜌𝜌 �
𝜕𝜕𝑽𝑽
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
+ (𝑽𝑽 ∗ 𝛁𝛁)𝑽𝑽� = −∇𝑃𝑃 + 𝜇𝜇∇2𝑽𝑽 + 𝑩𝑩 Equation 10 
Momentum eqaution 
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Here, density (ρ), viscosity (μ), are parameters that depend on the nature of the fluid being 
described. The same law can describe very different flows depending on these parameters. And 
just like the laws, the same boundary conditions can describe different conditions at the boundary 
because of this dependence on the parameters of the flow. The conditions at the boundary depend 
on other features of the flow, like shear stress. Just as the governing equations need parameters to 
tell us anything about a flow, the boundary condition needs parameters to be specified as well. Just 
as the same governing equations produces different flows depending on their inputs. This is 
perhaps similar to the argument in Bishop (2008), since some conditions at the molecular level 
depend on large scale features of the flow.  
The same boundary conditions can hold even though the underlying conditions at the 
boundary are different. This indicates the possibility of some kind of universal behavior. There are 
different ways to produce slip. Despite the underlying details not mattering, the boundary condition 
nevertheless can figure in an explanation of the fluid flow. There is reason to doubt that the 
underlying molecular picture can give us all of the explanations we want. There is a wide variety 
of phenomena that can give rise to slip. Whether these are all cases of apparent slip remains to be 
seen.  
This discussion gives a more complex picture than a straightforward reductionist or 
antireductionist account. Instead, I hope to have shown that we are better off talking about 
intertheory relations by specifying what those relations are in particular cases. Of course, in some 
sense, the nature of the fluid depends on the nature of the molecules of which it is composed. But 
the large scale features of the flow determine variables, which in turn determine the conditions at 
the boundary, which can be described at a molecular level. If the slip condition depends on shear 
rate, then we have a complex system where the boundary condition influences the flow field, but 
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the flow field influenced the boundary condition. Since boundary conditions and conditions at the 
boundary are different sorts of things, it should not be surprising that there does not exist a 
straightforward reduction relation. Rather, it is an inappropriate extrapolation of a model beyond 
the domain for which it was constructed. If the reductionist is right that this takes fluid dynamics 
too seriously, then the antireductionist would also be right that this takes molecular dynamics too 
seriously. In each case, a concept is extended beyond its intended domain. It is not a matter of 
taking one view or the other “too seriously.” Obviously, any real fluid will be made up of 
molecules, and the continuum assumption breaks down at a certain scale. But at the same time, 
fluid dynamics is able to capture phenomena that molecular dynamics is unable to. If we are not 
interested in wall effects, but instead are interested in the fluid dynamics of a particular system, 
we would still turn to the continuum equations. They would still require boundary conditions to 
work. Boundary condition is a constraint on the flow, not a description. But there is a way in which 
increasing our understanding of the molecular picture helps us understand the fluid dynamic 
picture. They are complementary.  
Even if future science explains the fluid picture in terms of the molecular picture, that will 
not change the central claim of this chapter. The practical difference between boundary conditions 
and conditions at the boundary is a result of their different roles in their respective theories, not 
the current state of the science. The conceptual difference means that conditions at the boundary 
and boundary conditions have different roles in scientific models. That is, even if we could derive 
boundary conditions from conditions at the boundary, these are two different kinds of things. As 
long as fluid dynamics exists as an independent field, so will this distinction. And it seems that 
fluid dynamics does provide explanations that molecular mechanics cannot.  I argue that this 
distinction does not depend on the current state of the science. Because of the respective roles they 
 58 
play in models, this remains a useful distinction. Learning the boundary conditions does not tell 
us what happens at the boundary, and knowing what happened at the boundary does not tell us 
what the correct boundary condition is.  The boundary condition is not meant to be a description 
of the boundary. It is sometimes useful to use a matching procedure to connect the two models, 
but this is a way of relating the conditions at the boundary to the boundary conditions. This relation 
is not identity. But the direction research has taken is to attempt to connect the molecular model 
to the boundary conditions that are known to hold on the macroscopic scale.  
Brenner and Ganesan note the difference between boundary conditions and conditions at 
the boundary is still important even when they seem to agree. In many cases, the boundary 
condition derived from the molecular conditions at the boundary matches the correct macroscale 
boundary condition. But given the difference between the two concepts, we cannot assume that 
the molecular model explains the continuum model. But in this case, the danger is drawing 
incorrect inferences in the molecular explanation of the boundary condition. Explanation of higher 
level phenomena in terms of lower level models is not straight forward, even if one can infer the 
boundary conditions from the conditions at the boundary.  
2.6 Conclusions 
Both conceptual analysis and  practical modeling techniques of fluid mechanics support the 
distinction between boundary conditions and conditions at the boundary. This distinction has 
implications for philosophical debates surrounding explanation and intertheory relations. More 
generally, we should pay attention to the particular role that the parts of a model play. This chapter 
has depended on fluid dynamics to explain conditions at the boundary, and so the definition made 
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reference to the boundary between a fluid and a solid. But we can generalize this concept anywhere 
boundary conditions operate. Boundary conditions operate in a variety of contexts besides fluid 
dynamics. If we want to model a drum head (Wilson, 1990) or a violin (Bursten, 2019), the 
conditions at the boundary would not include a fluid.  
In the next chapter, I will take a closer look at a particular aspect of conditions at the 
boundary: the boundary itself. We will see in closer detail just how conditions at the boundary 
arise, and how they depend on the form of the boundary. Despite the fact that the boundary is 
described at the molecular scale, the interactions that govern the molecules do not by themselves 
account for all of the behavior of the fluid.  
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3.0 Boundaries and Mesoscale Explanations 
The previous chapters have focused on the roles of boundary conditions and conditions at 
the boundary. In those chapters, I focused on the relationship between boundary conditions and 
the governing equations of fluid dynamics, arguing that the latter are not able to tell us much unless 
they are accompanied by boundary conditions. I have not yet said much about the other important 
piece of the puzzle: the boundaries themselves. The nature of fluid-solid boundaries, and their role 
in scientific modeling and theorizing, will be the central concerns of this chapter. To address these 
concerns, I will develop two examples that illustrate applications of boundary modeling in fluid 
dynamics: aerodynamic modeling of projectile nosecones and the formation of nanobubbles in 
multiscale modeling of fluid-solid interfaces. 
As I discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, fluid-solid boundaries are typically modeled with either 
fluid dynamics or molecular dynamics. In either case, modelers need to know something about the 
boundary. In the case of fluid dynamics, the shape of the surface that the fluid flows past will 
determine the shape and character of the flow. In the case of molecular dynamics, the description 
of the molecules of the solid boundary is just as important as the description of the fluid molecules 
in describing the conditions at the boundary. And while we must not conflate the boundary 
conditions and the conditions at the boundary, there is obviously some connection between the 
two. Molecular dynamics can capture boundary effects not found in the fluid dynamics, and these 
effects can explain why certain boundary conditions are appropriate at larger scales. But at the 
molecular scale too, the shape of the boundary can explain things about the boundary conditions 
at the fluid scale. That is, it is not just the interactions between individual molecules that explain 
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behavior at the fluid-dynamical scale; it is also the shape of the molecular boundary, as well other 
properties like the hydrophobicity of the molecules of the boundary.   
In between the macroscale of fluid dynamics and the microscale of molecular dynamics 
simulations lies a mesoscale. Phenomena at this scale cannot be inferred from either the scale 
above it or below it. In this chapter, I will argue that some features of boundaries are mesoscale 
features that are necessary for explanations of larger-scale phenomena and which cannot be 
reduced to smaller-scale phenomena without losing their explanatory force. First, I will show how 
boundaries themselves figure into explanation of fluid flows at the scale of fluid dynamics. Then 
I will present a case of molecular dynamics simulations, in which modelers aim to model nanoscale 
bubble formation. This case illustrates the limits of molecular dynamics for modeling fluid-solid 
boundary phenomena. It turns out that the formation of nanobubbles cannot be explained without 
modeling certain mesoscale boundary features, not inferable directly from the molecular dynamics. 
This mesoscale feature prevents a completely reductive explanation, because such an explanation 
cannot be derived from the molecular dynamics alone. Rather, mesoscale features like these 
depend on a number of factors beyond the scope of the molecular dynamics simulation. From this 
result, I derive some general conclusions about the nature of fluid-solid boundaries as mesoscale 
phenomena.  
3.1 How Boundaries Explain – Two Examples 
As we saw in Chapter 1, the governing equations of fluid dynamics by themselves are not 
enough to describe a fluid system. Modelers also need to specify boundary conditions. These 
boundary conditions are essential in providing an explanation for properties of a fluid flow. I 
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showed that boundary conditions can play various roles in explanation, sometimes acting more 
like laws, sometimes acting more like contingent matters of fact, and often occupying some place 
between these two extremes. Regardless of the theory of explanation one favors, the role of 
boundary conditions in fluid models determines their role in explanations.  
However, supplying the governing equations with boundary conditions is still not enough 
to describe a fluid system. We must also know where to apply these systems of equations. For this, 
we need to define the boundaries of the fluid system. As established in the previous chapter, 
boundaries are not the same thing as boundary conditions. A boundary condition constrains a 
differential equation by defining values of the solution at the boundaries, telling us what happens 
at the boundary. But the boundary itself defines the region governed by the differential equation 
and tells us where the boundary conditions obtain. Similarly, when we are dealing with conditions 
at the boundary, the boundary defines the region where the interactions between the fluid and the 
boundary take place. The difference is that when we are dealing with conditions at the boundary, 
the boundary must have additional properties that define its interactions with the fluid. Recall that 
it is these interactions that distinguish conditions at the boundary from boundary conditions.  
In the following subsections, I look at two examples of how boundary conditions explain 
flow properties. In the first example, I show how boundaries themselves can explain properties of 
fluid flows in fluid mechanical models. These boundaries demarcate the regions in which the 
governing equations and the boundary conditions hold, respectively. Basically, the boundary 
describes the geometry of the system being modeled.  
In the second example, I show how the boundary functions in a particular molecular model. 
In contrast to the first example, in this model, the boundary does more than describe the geometry 
of the system. It is a model that ascribes properties to individual molecules, both at the boundary 
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and in the fluid. These molecules interact, which results in the conditions at the boundary. 
Importantly, the properties of the molecules that make up the boundary are also necessary to 
explain the formation of nanobubbles.  
As I illustrate below with the nanobubbles case, boundaries also generate characteristically 
mesoscale physical behaviors, which are not derivable either from the mere specification of 
boundary conditions or from the governing equations of fluid flow. Other philosophers of physics 
studying mesoscale physical behaviors have recently argued that sometimes lower-scale behaviors 
can and should be ignored or parameterized away in an instance of modeling. (Batterman, 2013; 
Wilson, 2017; Bursten, 2019) Through careful explications of physical modeling, they have shown 
how mesoscale modeling generates justification for ignoring some microscale physical behaviors. 
Most of this research acknowledges that boundaries play an important explanatory role in the 
models under consideration, but studying the exact explanatory role of boundaries in multiscale 
models is not the primary focus of those investigations. The nanobubbles case builds on this body 
research and expands it into a new domain to show that without an appreciation of the contribution 
of boundaries to fluid behavior it is impossible to understand certain features of fluid flow, such 
as slip. And while mesoscale features of physical systems are often important for many sorts of 
physical modeling, they are especially crucial in fluid mechanics, where a central goal of modeling 
is the design of systems to manipulate and control fluid flows. So in order to build a philosophical 
account of fluid dynamics, we need to understand the explanatory roles not only the governing 
equations and boundary conditions, but also the boundaries themselves. In models of fluid systems, 
boundary conditions are set in conjunction with specifying the geometry of a solid that the fluid 
flows past. By specifying even the mere spatial orientation of the boundaries, we can explain the 
shape of the flow, and by developing robust accounts of the mesoscale physics at the boundary, 
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certain observed behaviors of fluid systems and their mathematical models can be rationalized, 
explained, and, therefore, manipulated. 
 
3.1.1  The Explanatory Role of Boundaries in Fluid Dynamics 
Specifying the geometry of the boundary is necessary to describe a fluid flow in 
computational fluid dynamics. Suppose an engineer wants to design the nosecone for a vehicle 
that will travel through the atmosphere at hypersonic speeds, such as manned atmospheric reentry 
vehicle for lunar missions. The shape of the nosecone affects the properties and overall shape of 
the fluid flow. Nosecones can take a variety of shapes, including conic, elliptical, spherical, and 
parabolic. For example, an elliptical nosecone can be described like this: 
 
 
𝑦𝑦 = 𝑅𝑅�1 − 𝜕𝜕2
𝐿𝐿2
 Equation 11 Elliptical nosecone  
 
where L is the length of the nosecone and R is the radius of the base, x varies from the tip of the 
nosecone to L, and y is the radius at any point x. Nosecone design affects factors like atmospheric 
drag and aerodynamic heating, as well as the formation of a shock layer in front of the vehicle. In 
supersonic flows, a shockwave appears some distance in front of the nosecone. The location of the 
shockwave that precedes the nosecone is a direct result of the geometry of the nosecone, along 
with the governing equations and boundary conditions. (Anderson, Albacete, & Winkelmann, 
1968) On the other hand, the vehicle’s material surface and boundary-level interactions with the 
atmosphere provide information about how the vehicle will weather the heat generated by 
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shockwave. Both the geometry and the interfacial dynamics are important for the heating 
properties of the body. Importantly, though, the impact of the shockwave on the material properties 
of the solid body cannot be derived from only looking at the interfacial, molecular-level 
interactions. The geometry is an indispensable feature in the model. The shape of the nosecone of 
reentry vehicle or the shape of an airfoil are the sorts of features of bodies that are ripe for 
manipulation, and, therefore, which are often the subject of experimental investigation and 
simulations. As a result, they are also crucial explanantia in many explanations of the design of 
bodies intended for supersonic flight. When engineers design these things, they are limited in the 
kinds of things they can manipulate in their models. There are some things that physics of the 
situation decides for them: generally, they are stuck with the governing equations, which limits 
their ability to manipulate certain macroscopic details of the model. Similarly, the material of the 
object generally fixes the boundary condition and thus limits their ability to manipulate microscale 
surface-level interactions. But these engineers do have a lot of control over the mesoscale in their 
ability to manipulate the geometry of the nosecone or airfoil. And determining the effects of 
changing boundary geometry is often precisely the goal of these investigations. For example, it 
turns out, for bodies moving at hypersonic speeds through the atmosphere, that a blunt shape 
nosecone results in less aerodynamic heating than a thinner, sharp nosecone. This is due to the 
fluid flow characteristics as the fluid passes the nosecone. In effect, the blunt shape results in a 
cushion of air being pushed in front of the body, forcing the heated shock layer away from the 
body. So we can have two nose cone designs. The governing equations of fluid dynamics are the 
same in both cases. And in both cases, the same boundary condition is used. However, the 
difference is the geometry of the nosecone, which forms the boundary of the flow.   
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3.1.2  The Formation of Nanobubbles 
Whereas the previous case study emphasized the role of geometry in the conditions at the 
boundary in computational fluid dynamics, here I look at how simulations are used to make 
inferences about fluid flows near solid boundaries. I use a case study on the formation of stable 
nanobubbles. In this case as well, the intertheory inferences that are made between the molecular 
dynamics (MD) and fluid models of nanobubbles rely on what I have identified as mesoscale 
features of the boundary. 
Above, I identified the geometry of nosecones as a mesoscale feature in computational 
fluid dynamics, and I showed how certain modeling considerations made this feature one of special 
interest in designing bodies for supersonic flight. In the case of MD simulations below, I will show 
that surface features like roughness or layers of gas are mesoscale features. The philosophical point 
about explanation here is even stronger than in the last section. There I argued that the mesoscale 
conditions at the boundary are important because of their manipulability. Here I will show that the 
mesoscale features of the system, which are encoded by the conditions at the boundary, are 
explanatorily and predictively indispensable. That is, when trying to explain the macroscopic 
boundary conditions with the governing equations of molecular dynamics alone, the MD 
simulations often fail to predict what is observed at the macroscopic level.  
Molecular simulations are used to predict and explain how nanobubbles form. In particular, 
they can provide an explanation for nanobubbles’ formation and stability. While the result depends 
on the physics that governs the molecular interactions, it also depends on the configuration of the 
wall molecules. I will argue that this wall configuration represents the conditions at the boundary 
on this flow, that it is a mesoscale feature of the simulated fluid flow, and that it is indispensable 
to certain explanatory projects in fluid dynamics. 
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There are different ways to build an MD model. One way is to describe interactions 
between fluid molecules with a Lennard-Jones potential, which computes the energetic minimum 
between two interacting atoms or molecules; that is, it specifies a system’s dynamics by finding 
the lowest-energy state of a system via summation over nearest-neighbor interactions. This model 
is moderately computationally intensive, in that each molecule requires its own state description. 
In Lennard-Jones models, as in many MD simulations, the interactions between the molecules of 
the flowing fluid and the molecules that make up the solid boundary are also governed by local, 
nearest-neighbor potentials. For these interactions, though, instead of freely moving around like 
the fluid molecules, though, the molecules of the solid boundary are fixed on a lattice, or coupled 
to a lattice with a spring constant. (Lauga & Stone, 2003)  
In a model of this sort, the specification of the lattice spacing and average interatomic 
distance of molecules in the solid boundary constitute the boundary condition. In contrast, the 
dynamical interactions between the lattice-bound solid molecules and the freely flowing fluid 
molecules constitute the conditions at the boundary. The conditions at the boundary are dynamical 
parts of the computed flow, whereas the boundary conditions are not. Some of the features of the 
boundary that have an effect on these conditions at the boundary are (1) the geometry of the lattice, 
(2) any spring constant used to couple a boundary molecule to the lattice, (3) the defined Lennard-
Jones potential for the interaction between the solid and fluid molecules, and (4) the depth of the 
solid boundary layer. These conditions are able to be represented in state descriptions of local 
Lennard-Jones interactions between fluid and solid molecules, but these features are necessarily 
derived from sources other than the Lennard-Jones potentials governing the fluid flow. 
These properties of the boundary will influence the molecular interactions in the rest of the 
model, as well, because fluid molecules that enter the boundary region where they interact with 
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these conditions will depart that region having been impacted by the dynamical constraints in (1)–
(4). Further, as might be expected, the MD model can explain elements of the fluid dynamics 
model. But the explanation is not fully reductionist, since it is not just the microscale physics of 
the free fluid molecules that determines the molecular flow. Additionally, these features of the 
boundary occupy a scale between the molecular scale model and the continuum scale model.   
In order to see the unique role that these features play in explanation, we first need to look 
more closely at how MD simulations are constructed. Generally, MD simulations integrate 
numerically Newton’s law of motion for individual molecules:  
 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑2𝒓𝒓𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕2
=  �𝑭𝑭𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
 Equation 12 Newton’s law of 
motion for single atoms 
 
Here, mi is the atomic mass, ri is the position of atom i, and Fij is the intermolecular force between 
atoms i and j. The intermolecular force Fij is given by: 
 
 𝑭𝑭𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = −∇𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Equation 13 Intermolecular force 
 
where Vij is the interaction potential. A commonly used interaction potential, which I described 
conceptually above, is the Lennard-Jones two-body potential:  
 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 4𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 − 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6� Equation 14 Lennard-Jones two-body potential 
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Here εij is the interaction strength, σ is the atomic size, rij is the distance between atoms i and j. 
This potential is useful for a wide variety of systems, and it can be modified to take into account 
different kinds of molecules. More complex potentials can be introduced, which might take into 
account things like many-body interactions or orientation-dependent interactions, but these are 
computationally more costly.  
With these preliminaries established, I want to look more closely now at the case study on 
the formation of nanobubbles. Surface nanobubbles are less than 1 micrometer in height as 
measured from the solid surface with which they are in contact. In flows of liquids over solid 
boundaries, nanobubbles can form and affect the boundary conditions at the continuum scale. 
(Maali & Bhushan, 2013) The following summarizes a simulation of nanobubble formation run by 
Maheshwari et al. (2016). The simulation used a Lennard-Jones potential to define the interactions 
between the molecules. There were four types of molecules: two types of solid molecules (S and 
Sp), liquid molecules (L), and gas molecules (G). The L and G molecules could move freely, while 
the two solid molecules were fixed in a face-centered cubic (fcc) lattice, which represented the 
boundary. Importantly, spacing and orientation of this lattice were obtained from empirical 
considerations, not from information about the liquid or gas molecules. The values of the Lennard-
Jones parameters are summarized in Table 1. Note especially the difference between interactions 
strengths ε for the hydrophobic solid (S) and the hydrophilic solid (Sp).  
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Table 1 Lennard-Jones parameters 
i-j σij, nm εij, kJ/mol 
S-L 0.34 1.8 
Sp-L 0.34 1.5 
S-G 0.40 2.0 
Sp-G 0.40 5.0 
L-G 0.40 1.55 
G-G 0.46 0.8 
L-L 0.34 3.0 
 
 
In addition to the Lennard-Jones parameters, the saturation level of the gas in the liquid 
was specified. The saturation level ζ of the gas in the liquid is given by:  
 
 
𝜁𝜁 = 𝐶𝐶∞
𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁
− 1 Equation 15 Saturation level 
 
where C∞ is the gas concentration and CS is the gas solubility. If ζ > 0 indicates gas oversaturation, 
while ζ < 0 indicates gas undersaturation.10  
                                                 
10 Unlike some properties that can be inferred from lower scale phenomena, the higher scale properties of the 
boundary cannot be explained in virtue of being the aggregation of pairwise interactions described by the molecular 
scale physics. The saturation level of the gas in the liquid can be thought of as such an aggregation, since it depends 
only on the concentration and the solubility. The over- or undersaturation level of the gas does not depend on particular 
arrangements of the gas molecules. In that sense, saturation levels support reductive explanations.  
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Simulations were run with four different boundary configurations and saturation 
conditions. The simulation conditions were 1) homogenous solid surface and gas oversaturated 
liquid 2) hydrophobic solid surface heterogeneities and gas undersaturated liquid 3) hydrophilic 
solid surface heterogeneities and gas oversaturated liquid 4) hydrophobic surface heterogeneities 
and gas oversaturated liquid. The homogeneous boundary was made entirely of S molecules. The 
boundary with hydrophobic surface heterogeneities was made of mostly S molecules interspersed 
with regions of Sp molecules. The Sp molecules formed “pinning sites,” or areas of higher 
hydrophobicity than the S molecules. This means that the solid’s interaction strength with gas 
molecules was much higher than with liquid molecules. For the boundary with hydrophilic 
heterogeneities, the same boundary configuration was used, but the values of ε (SP-G) and ε (SP-
L) were interchanged. The pinning sites should be interpreted as different kinds of molecules on a 
flat surface. 
 
 
Figure 3 A typical simulation box with four kinds of particles  
Reprinted with permission from Maheshwari, van der Hoef, Zhang, & Lohse (2016) 
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The central result is that the simulation produced stable nanobubbles only in the case of 
gas oversaturated liquid and hydrophobic heterogeneities. This result matches predictions made 
previously (Lohse & Zhang, 2015).  Simulation with either undersaturation, a homogenous 
surface, or hydrophilic heterogeneities resulted in nanobubbles that were unstable. Saturation level 
alone are not enough to explain the persistence of nanobubbles. In similar conditions, but without 
the pinning sites of the solid surface, bulk nanobubbles dissolve in milliseconds. With pinning 
sites, they can last for days (Epstein & Plesset, 1950)  
The results of this simulation demonstrate two of the causal factors that explain 
nanobubbles. One is the extent to which the gas has saturated the liquid. The other is the 
heterogeneities of the solid boundary. Both oversaturation and hydrophobic heterogeneities are 
required for the formation of stable nanobubbles. In contrast to the saturation of gas molecules, 
which I do take to be reductive, the heterogeneities are mesoscale features that do not yield a 
reductive explanation. The gas saturation can be explained in terms of the microscale physics, 
while the configuration of the boundary cannot.  
The crucial thing to see here is that the formation of stable nanobubbles depends on features 
of the boundary that are composed of many molecules. Even though these features are built out of 
the molecules, and are subject to the molecular scale interactions, they are larger features. The 
pinning effect is not limited to chemical heterogeneities either. Pinning sites can be the result of 
geometrical heterogeneities as well. (Liu & Zhang, 2017) Such pinning sites represent surface 
roughness, and can also produce stable nanobubbles.  
The solid boundaries of the MD simulation do more than just define the geometry of the 
region governed by the interaction potentials. They can have more features than the boundaries 
used in the computational fluid dynamics model discussed in the previous section. They are made 
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of molecules, like the molecules of the fluid, but with different sizes, masses, and interaction 
strengths. The strength of that interaction will depend on empirically-derived details about the 
molecules involved.  But unlike the fluid molecules, the molecules of the boundary are not able to 
move around freely. They can be fixed in a lattice or attached to a lattice by a spring constant and 
allowed to oscillate. The nature of boundary also depends on how many layers of solid molecules 
there are in the boundary. 
3.2 Two Senses of “Boundary” 
Chapter 2 emphasized the distinction between boundary conditions and conditions at the 
boundary. The case studies above show that something else falls out of the distinction between 
boundary conditions and conditions at the boundary as well: each of these two concepts employs 
its own concept of boundary. Boundary conditions serve a specific mathematical purpose in fluid 
dynamics models. They constrain the solutions to differential equations by specifying the values 
that the solution must take at the boundary. In this way, they are an instance of what Wilson (2017) 
has called “physics avoidance”: they encode information about the interactions between the fluid 
and the boundary, but they do not explicitly describe the interactions. Conditions at the boundary, 
on the other hand, explicitly take into account interactions between the fluid and the boundary. 
This means that additional information about, and more detailed models of, boundary behaviors 
are required to determine how the fluid and boundary interact.  
The boundary delineates the region where the governing equations operate and the region 
where the boundary condition obtains. As opposed to an instance of physics avoidance, this is 
closer to the sort of system-defining specification of a domain that Cartwright (1999) describes in 
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the construction of nomological machines and which Mitchell (2014; 2012; 2009) investigates in 
her studies on emergence in dynamic, self-organizing systems. As I will show below, for many 
cases of fluid modeling, defining the boundary requires more than specifying its geometry. The 
boundary interacts with the fluid, and those interactions need to be specified. In the following 
discussion of this chapter’s case studies, my goals are to illustrate the limits of the physics-
avoidance account in explaining the role of conditions at the boundary in fluid modeling, and to 
supplement accounts like Cartwright’s and Mitchell’s, which emphasize the importance of 
specifying domains of application in building physical explanations. 
3.3 The Explanatory Role of Molecular Boundaries 
The nanobubbles described above are important for explaining the boundary conditions at 
the macroscopic scale. As I argued in the last chapter, boundary conditions cannot always be 
inferred in a straightforward way from the conditions at the boundary. Molecular simulations often 
systematically underpredict, by an order of magnitude, the amount of slip inferred from 
macroscopic experiments. (Karniadakis, Beskok, & Aluru, p. 396) So it would seem that the 
simulations are failing to capture some feature of the physical system, and it is likely that 
mesoscale features of the boundary are such features. This illustrates the point I made above, that 
there are limits to the applicability of physics-avoidance strategies in fluid-dynamical modeling. 
There are other explanations that rely on not just the interactions between the fluid and the 
boundary, but also on the boundary itself. For instance, de Gennes (2002) suggests that, for liquid 
flow, the boundary is not just the interface between solid and liquid. Instead, he shows how a thin 
film of gas between the solid and the liquid can produce the slip seen at the continuum level. This 
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suggests, following Cartwright and Mitchell, that an important part of building explanations from 
conditions at the boundary is clearly specifying the domain of application for those conditions. I 
discuss the importance of domains of application more in the next chapter.  
Before I get to that discussion, though, I want to emphasize a how boundaries of the sort 
modeled in this case study play an essential role in explanations of macroscopic fluid dynamical 
behavior. In particular, conditions at the boundary can, and boundary conditions cannot, explain a 
particular unexpected phenomenon that interests computational fluid dynamics modelers: 
increased slip on rough surfaces. It is perhaps counterintuitive to think that a rough surface would 
provide more slip than a smooth one, yet that is what some models predict. For example, 
Richardson (1973) and later Jansons (1988) use only fluid dynamics to show how a macroscopic 
no-slip condition might emerge from a smaller scale slip condition. They model a fluid flowing 
past a boundary with small defects. Defects as small as 10-9m can produce a slip length of only 10-
5m, which at larger scales is indistinguishable from a no-slip condition. But these studies are 
limited, since they do not explicitly take into account the interactions with the boundary. When we 
do take the microstructure of the boundary into account, a different picture emerges. If there are 
pockets of gas in tiny cracks on a solid surface, then they act as local stress-free boundaries, and a 
fluid would be flowing over alternating regions of slip and no-slip. This results in an effective 
partial slip condition at higher scales. 
We saw that the formation and maintenance of these pockets of gas are explained using 
MD simulations of boundaries with varying degrees of surface heterogeneity. (Liu & Zhang, 2017; 
Maheshwari, van der Hoef, Zhang, & Lohse, 2016). On surfaces without heterogeneities, 
nanobubbles can form but are not stable. In contrast, on surfaces with heterogeneities, surface 
nanobubbles are stable. When a fluid can wet only the peaks of the rough surface, gas is trapped 
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in the grooves. This is known as a Cassie state. (Full surface wetting is known as a Wenzel state.) 
When a nanobubble nucleates in a groove of a rough surface, a local Cassie state is formed, that 
is, gas is trapped in the groove. The gas in the cavity can coalesce and the nanobubble can grow 
and join with other nanobubbles from adjacent cavities. These then become stable surface 
nanobubbles, which extend above the level of the peaks of the rough surface, ultimately forming 
a Wenzel state.  
In this explanation of the causal role of gas pockets in the formation of nanobubbles, the 
key thing to see is that the boundary itself is playing an essential role in explaining the 
nanobubbles. Since the MD simulation explicitly takes into account the interactions between the 
fluid and the boundary, it describes the conditions at the boundary. The fact that the boundary has 
pockets of air explains the slip conditions observed at the continuum scale. Not only is the 
explanatory role of the boundary essential to these explanations; it is not reducible to either 
molecular dynamics or fluid mechanics alone. It lies between the two, imparting an essential set 
of mesoscale features on which both theories can draw.  
The centrality of boundaries in explanations of slip via nanobubble formation builds on the 
earlier discussion of the explanatory role of nosecone geometry in supersonic rocket design. The 
earlier case showed that in fluid dynamics, conditions at the boundary are mesoscale and are 
important for achieving certain goals (i.e. making rockets that don’t explode) consistent with 
explanatory projects. Here I have shown that conditions at the boundary, and boundaries 
themselves, can play explanatory roles that are not just important but indispensable given the 
modeling tools currently used. The failure of reduction in explaining nanobubble formation 
establishes this point. 
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3.3.1  Boundaries as Mesoscale  
I will close this chapter with a final point on how these observations fit into recent 
discussion of multiscale modeling in philosophy of science. In particular, I believe this chapter’s 
emphasis on the mesoscale nature of boundaries will contribute to a growing literature on 
mesoscale modeling and explanation. Mesoscale explanations have become a topic of some recent 
interest in the philosophy of physics. (Batterman, 2013; Wilson, 2017; Haueis, 2018) These 
middle-out approaches are not reductive. But they are not merely the result of universal behavior 
either. There are systematic reasons for their regularities, which distinguishes mesoscale 
explanations from universal or emergent ones. In fluid mechanics, mesoscale explanations 
frequently require another layer of explanation that has to do with the production of materials, 
whether by natural or human-controlled processes. She argues that tuning is a separate use of 
models, beyond explanation or prediction. However, tuning can also be explained, and in such 
explanations of why a pipe should be coated in such a way, or machined one way instead of 
another, the boundary plays a unique mesoscale explanatory role.  
These mesoscale features cannot be explained by the physics that governs the molecular 
interactions. There is nothing special about the particular arrangement of the boundary molecules. 
The more important question is about why we should expect to see that kind of boundary. To 
borrow a familiar distinction, it is a type (ii) question, rather than a type (i). (Batterman, 2002, p. 
23). What makes them effective tools in mesoscale explanations is not just that they happen to 
obtain, but they can be expected to obtain as well. A type (i) question would ask why a particular 
piece of glass has a particular surface roughness. However, no two pieces of glass are exactly the 
same at the molecular scale. Nevertheless, we can expect them to exhibit consistent behavior 
because glasses typically have consistent conditions at their boundaries. We can, for example, 
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expect a certain degree of roughness on pieces of glass on a certain type. An answer to this question 
would answer the type (ii) question. The roughness itself is not explained by the molecular 
constitution of the glass, even though it can be described by the molecular dynamics. There are 
mesoscale features that cannot be predicted by the molecular simulations, but that also cannot be 
inferred from fluid dynamics.  
The prominence of mesoscale features makes straightforward reductive accounts of 
explanation difficult. The explanations for the mesoscale features do not come from the physics of 
the microscale model. The boundary is described in terms of the molecules and their interactions 
with fluid molecules. Further, boundaries fall into a larger class of mesoscale phenomena. The 
boundary heterogeneities do work similar to the mesoscale features of steel beams. The properties 
of steel at the macroscopic scale cannot be explained by the symmetric crystalline lattice structures. 
In between the microscopic scale and the macroscale, things like point defects, line defects, slip 
dislocations, and other properties appear that explain the properties of steel at the macroscale. 
(Batterman, 2013)  
The mesoscale features of the boundary, and of conditions at the boundary, resist reductive 
explanations of macroscale fluid behavior. That is, the behavior of a fluid at a boundary at the 
macroscale cannot be explained entirely in terms of the lower scale physics. The presence of 
surface nanobubbles results in apparent slip. While not considered true slip, since the no-slip 
condition applies at the locations where the fluid is in contact with the solid boundary, the 
nanobubbles are too small to be characterized with standard continuum models. So the apparent 
slip is described as if it were actual partial slip. The nanobubbles responsible for this partial slip 
depend on the existence of the surface heterogeneities.  
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If the correct macroscale boundary condition depends on not only the microscale physics 
(such as the Lennard-Jones dynamics discussed above), but on the mesoscale features of the 
boundary, then a completely reductive explanation is out of reach. This appears highly likely from 
the previous sections’ case study. In some sense, a molecular dynamics simulation of the 
conditions at the boundary can explain the boundary conditions, but only if the molecular dynamic 
simulation specifies mesoscale boundary features. The microscale model explains the macroscale, 
but only mediated by the mesoscale objects, the nanobubbles, and ultimately the boundary features 
that result in the nanobubbles. Complementarily, it is worth noting that the boundary in the fluid 
dynamics model is also not derived from the physics that govern the model. The governing 
equations plus the boundary conditions do not say anything about the shape of the boundary.  
However, to close this point, it is worth emphasizing an important contrast, which I have 
so far only hinted at, between the specification of nosecone geometry in the first case study and 
the investigation on nanobubble formation in the second study. In each case, the modelers had 
relative freedom to choose the geometry of the boundary. The rocket modelers are able to choose 
a geometry that will optimize the flow in the manner useful to atmospheric reentry. The 
nanobubble modelers have freedom too, but they have different reasons for their choice. The 
purpose of their model is not to engineer, but to explain fluid flow. The heterogeneity built into 
their model is there, not because it is optimizes some feature of the flow for manipulability, but 
because we can expect to find conditions like that in actual channels. This helps to make clear, too, 
why such a model ended up being particularly apt for use in developing the further mesoscale 
explanation of apparent slip via surface roughness. 
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One could ask whether the kinds of explanations furnished by the geometries and other 
features of the boundaries are genuinely meso-scale in nature.11 To call something mesoscale 
implies that it happens as a scale between at least two other scales. The description of the pinning 
sites in the model is still a molecular scale description, after all.  
Ultimately, the force of the explanation comes not from the scale of the features, but from 
the way they are formed. In the case of the shape of the nosecone, there is no type (ii) explanation, 
at least not in the same way there is for the molecular simulation. An explanation for the shape of 
the nosecone presumably stems from the choices of engineers who designed the nosecone. It is a 
notable feature of these systems, though, that the tuning or design feature being manipulated lies 
at a mesoscopic scale. As philosophical interest in mesoscale modeling continues to grow, I 
suspect that the connection between tunability and mesoscale modeling will be a rich area for 
further exploration. 
3.4 Conclusions 
Chapters 1 and 2 have painted a picture of boundary phenomena that is much more complex 
than has been assumed by philosophers. This chapter’s discussion of boundaries as inherently 
mesoscale is meant to add to that complexity. Boundaries play different explanatory roles 
depending on the model in which they operate, but in both of the cases developed here, these roles 
slot boundaries in as mesoscale explanantia and illustrate how their roles in explanation are 
importantly distinct from the roles of governing laws and boundary conditions. The features of 
                                                 
11 Thanks to Bob Batterman for raising this point.  
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fluid-solid boundaries can be described using the molecular level theory, but which the molecular 
theory by itself does not explain. Ultimately, there is a reason we systematically find certain types 
of mesoscopic features. And perhaps, the reductionist might claim, the reason is a lower level 
phenomenon. I share some sympathy with this view, maybe more than is fashionable, but I believe 
a better way to analyze these regularities is with an eye toward the implications for realism, rather 
than reduction, which will be the subject of the next chapter. And I must admit, while these 
boundaries are built out of the constituents of the microscale simulation, the form they take cannot 
be predicted from the microscale physics alone. However, these mesoscale boundaries are not mere 
contingent matters of fact either.  
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4.0 Boundary Conditions, Domains of Application, and an Argument for Realism 
In the previous chapters, I showed that there is a conceptual difference between boundary 
conditions and conditions at the boundary, and that this difference produces models that seem to 
make incompatible claims about how fluids behave near a solid boundary. This kind of 
incompatibility bring to light a problem for scientific realists, since under most standard account 
of scientific realism, at most only one of the models can be an accurate description of the world. 
One of the responses to this problem is that these models are complementary, not contradictory. 
That is, they each represent part of the target system rather than the whole system. And while I 
think this is largely correct, merely showing that different models correctly model different parts 
of the world leaves out a significant part of the story. It is not just the part of the world being 
modeled that makes the difference, but also the conditions in which the model is employed. In this 
chapter, I take a closer look at the experimental investigation of boundary conditions at a fluid-
solid boundary, namely investigation of the no-slip condition. This will the basis for an argument 
for realism from examination of the conditions under which a model breaks down. So instead of 
incompatible models leading to antirealism, I will argue that it is precisely this incompatibility that 
is evidence for realism.  
I begin with brief remarks on the interpretation of the no-slip condition under a canonical 
antirealism, the constructive empiricism of Bas van Fraassen. These remarks motivate some of my 
long-standing concerns about how the no-slip condition might slot into a realist or empiricist 
ontology. In order to resolve these concerns, I then turn to contemporary considerations on models 
and realism, since the no-slip condition is investigated through modeling more often than through 
direct experimental probing. I look at the apparent inconsistency between models that emerges 
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when we look at fluid flows from different perspectives and, following Margaret Morrison (2015), 
highlight complementarity of models, as a possible means of recovering realism. I will build on 
the idea of complementary models to look at how models, generally, have a domain of application. 
We are able to know not just where these domains begin and end, but also how they relate to the 
model in question in messy, technical detail that generates a warrant for belief in the reality of 
some of the model’s parts. Specifically, we are able to learn about how the conditions that define 
a domain of application are causally linked to the success or failure of the model. I will argue that 
a realist stance toward the no-slip condition is supported by experiments that increase 
understanding of the conditions that define its domain of application. To do this, I will look at the 
experimental methods used to examine slip phenomena, and at the results of these methods. How 
parts of models relate to their respective domain of application gives us evidence for realism. The 
results of these methods are not merely verdicts as to whether or not the no slip condition was able 
to make a prediction successfully. Rather, they produce causal knowledge of the conditions under 
which the no slip condition holds. Although I will make this argument on the basis of fluid 
dynamics, I believe an analogous pattern of reasoning can be found in a variety of other contexts. 
Since our epistemic attitude depends in part on a model’s domain of application, the kind of realism 
supported by this argument is a local realism.   
4.1 Observability, Realism, and Slip 
Fluid dynamics might seem like a strange setting for the scientific realism debate to take 
place. After all, this is the physics of the water going down the drain of your sink, not some exotic 
subatomic particles or miniature black holes created in the Large Hadron Collider. In fluid 
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dynamics, the issue of realism does not surround canonical unobservable entities like electrons. 
However, there are parts of fluid models that are subject to anti-realist arguments. I will review 
two avenues of antirealist argument that apply here.12  
One standard challenge to realism depends on the distinction between observable and 
unobservable parts of theory. Traditionally, this distinction has depended on human sensory 
capacities. This challenge can be traced back to form of instrumentalism associated with the 
Vienna Circle (Carnap, Hempel, et al.). According to this kind of account, terms for unobservables 
by themselves are not meaningful. Rather they are instruments for predicting behavior of 
observables. While this particular line of antirealist thought has fallen out of fashion, more 
recently, constructive empiricism has continued this line of thinking. Owing in particular to van 
Fraassen (1980), constructive empiricism claims that the aim of science is empirical adequacy, not 
truth. On this view a theory or model is empirically adequate “exactly if what it says about the 
observable things and evens in the world, is true.” (van Fraassen, 1980, p. 12) 
There are features of fluid flow that are unobservable in van Fraassen’s sense. Slip 
phenomena generally, and the no-slip condition in particular, are hypotheses that have been useful 
in building fluid models for centuries. Yet they remain unobservable in the sense employed by 
constructive empiricism. By these standards, even so called “direct” experimental practices cannot 
be said to observe slip, and there is currently no way to directly observe what happens at the 
boundary of a fluid flow, in the region within a few micrometers of the boundary.  
                                                 
12 I am limiting my discussion to the lines of antirealist argument that are relevant to my argument. So I will 
not be discussing arguments based on historical considerations (e.g. Kuhn, 1962) or social constructivism (e.g. Latour 
& Wooglar, 1986; Pickering, 1984). My argument simply does not address these positions.  
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While the argument to follow will not try to break down the distinction between observable 
and unobservable, the purported unobservability of the slip is still important. Even if there is no 
principled way to draw a line between the observable and unobservable, there does seem to be 
degrees of how directly a phenomenon can be detected. It is relevant to the discussion that the part 
of the model in question requires a significant degree of experimental and theoretical apparatus to 
detect.  
There are three general ways of investigating slip phenomena. I bring this up because none 
of the three ways provides an observation, in the sense of the constructive empiricists, of fluid 
flows at the boundary. And since the no-slip condition cannot be observed, it is the sort of thing 
that realism debate targets. The first way to investigate slip is through indirect methods, which 
infer slip length by measuring some macroscopic quantity that stands in an already known relation 
to slip length. These are essentially the same sorts of experiments used to confirm slip on the 
macroscopic scale, but more recently, they can be carried out in nanochannels. (Karniadakis, 
Beskok, & Aluru, 2005) 
 The second way to investigate slip is through local methods, which attempt to measure 
slip more directly, via for example high-resolution microscopy and the use of tracer particles. And 
while these methods do not rely on inference from other macroscopic parameters, they are not 
actually considered direct. (Shu, Teo, & Chan, 2017, p. 15) As it was recently explained in a review 
of work in this area, “[n]o experimental technique is able to distinguish between the two pictures 
[i.e. true slip and apparent slip] and to directly measure the motion of molecular layers of liquids 
close to a surface.” (Neto, Evans, Bonaccurso, Butt, & Craig, 2005, p. 2885) While these methods 
are considered more direct, there are still complications that prevent us from actually observing 
flow variables right at the boundary. Tracer particles might also be subject to electrical effects that 
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cause them to either stick to the wall or be repelled from it. So there is still enough inference 
involved to prevent this from being an observation of the boundary conditions.   
The third way slip is investigated is through molecular dynamics simulations, which 
simulate the motions of individual molecules at a liquid-solid boundary. These results can be 
interpreted in the continuum limit, and then applied as a boundary condition. As we saw in Chapter 
2, care must be taken when inferring boundary conditions from these molecular dynamics 
simulations. While there is debate about the relationship between simulations and experiment, the 
results of these simulations are often treated as evidence in the same sense as experimental 
results.13 Neto et al. note that “the slip lengths estimated by simulations are normally much smaller 
than those measured in physical experiments.” (Neto, Evans, Bonaccurso, Butt, & Craig, 2005, p. 
2879) 
None of these three ways of investigating slip phenomena provides an actual observation 
of fluid flows at the boundary. The no-slip condition cannot be observed by any present means, 
and current research tends away from methods of investigating slip that are likely to result in a 
direct observation. So, claims about slip are at most empirically adequate, in the constructive-
empiricist framework. However, slip is not an “exotic” phenomenon that must be cordoned off in 
the laboratory under pristine conditions—it happens in soda cans and bathtubs. It is exactly the 
sort of mundane phenomenon that we interact with daily, which scientific realists want to 
safeguard as part of the real world. Moreover, it is their reality that motivates researchers to 
investigate them in order to put them to use in technologies. So empirical adequacy as a resolution 
for slip is unsatisfying at best, and at worst it could run a risk of missing the rationale and goals of 
                                                 
13 For further discussion of the epistemic role of computer simulations relative to experiments in 
contemporary science, see Winsberg (2010). 
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research. In my argument below on the Domain of Application, I will show that some of the probes 
of slip phenomena in slip research in fact generate reasons to be realists about slip. That argument 
needs some groundwork about how philosophical accounts of scientific models factor in to 
contemporary views on scientific realism, so before I develop it, I want to lay out a challenge to 
antirealism specifically from studying modeling practices in fluid dynamics.  
4.2 Realism and Models 
While there is a challenge to the truth of the no-slip condition that stems from the ways we 
experimentally detect slip, there is a further challenge to realism that does not come from the 
distinction between observable and unobservable entities. Instead, this challenge comes from 
scientific modeling practices. (Cartwright, 1983; Godfrey-Smith, 2006; Wimsatt, 2007; Morgan 
& Morrison, 1999; Teller, 2001) Successful models often have non-representational features, 
which are chosen for pragmatic reasons, such as mathematical tractability. They often make free 
use of idealizations, and so these models represent systems that do not exist or could not possibly 
exist. Such a model-based approach to science is often thought to support some kind of scientific 
antirealism. And these sorts of non-realistic models might make for better explanations, severing 
the link between truth and explanation. With respect to scientific laws, for example, Cartwright 
(1983) argues for severing the connection between explanation and truth. She points to cases of 
highly idealized models that are very dissimilar from their target systems, and are explanatory 
precisely because of their idealized nature. Conversely, more realistic models fail to be 
explanatory.  
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The focus on modeling practice also shifts the focus away from entities. It is not 
unobservability, but rather approximations, idealizations, and fictions used in successful models 
that are reason to doubt their truth. Some have argued that such approximations, idealizations, and 
fictions can be eliminated by providing the models with more detail. (Laymon, 1985) On these 
accounts, the addition of these previously suppressed details results in more realistic models, as 
evidenced by their improved predictions. In response, it has been pointed out that the practice of 
de-idealizing models does not always improve the model (Cartwright, 1989), and such de-
idealizations do not reflect actual scientific practice. (Hartmann, 1998) 
The modeling practices of fluid dynamics are an ideal target for this challenge to realism. 
Rueger (2005) and Morrison (2015) note the variety of fluid mechanical models that serve different 
explanatory purposes. The use of models in fluid dynamics seems to support a model-based 
approach to science. When modeling fluid systems, scientists have a collection of modeling tools 
that they can employ when constructing models. Problems are typically solved by using the tools 
of the theory to build a model of a fluid system.  As we saw in previous chapters, depending on 
the details of the target system, the modeler must choose an appropriate set of boundary conditions. 
But there are more decisions to make than just the boundary conditions. Recall that there are 
different versions of the governing equations as well: each one has a viscous and non-viscous form 
as well as a conservation and non-conservation form. In practice, none of these versions is regarded 
as the unequivocal best equation for describing fluid systems. Rather, the details of the target 
system determine which tools are the best for that particular system.  
Given the distinction between boundary conditions and conditions at the boundary 
explored in the previous chapter, I want to focus on one argument in particular: the incompatible 
models argument. (Morrison, 2000) This argument is an extension of the more general antirealist 
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argument from modeling practices. Scientists often use models that represent incompatible claims 
about the same target system. Since they assign incompatible properties to the same target system, 
these models imply a contradiction. Therefore, at most one of the models can be an accurate 
representation of the target system.  
We saw this kind of incompatibility when I explored the difference between boundary 
conditions and conditions at the boundary. When modeling the boundary condition of a diffusive 
system, a slip condition is correct, but when modeling the conditions at the boundary, the fluid 
does not slip relative to the boundary. The challenge to the realist, then, is what to make of this 
discrepancy.   
4.2.1  Responses to the Modeling Challenge  
Some like Giere (2006), Rueger (2005), van Fraassen (2008), and Callebaut (2012) respond 
to the problem of incompatible models with perspectivism. Since there is no “view from nowhere”, 
this line of thinking goes, the world can only be represented from some perspective or other, and 
any attempt to step outside of a perspective is fruitless. And so, the perspectivist argues, our 
knowledge of the world is limited to the way things seem from some perspective or other. On this 
view, truth is relativized to a perspective, and even though Giere thinks of perspectivism as a form 
of realism, it is hard to see how it qualifies as such. According to Giere’s perspectivism, the best 
we can do in making claims about ontology is justify claims such as, “According to this highly 
confirmed theory (or reliable instrument), the world seems to be roughly such and such.” In 
contrast to this, we cannot justify claims like “This theory (or instrument) provides us with a 
complete and literally correct picture of the world itself.” (Giere, 2006, p. 6)  
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I agree that a “complete and literally correct picture” is not attainable, but Giere seems to 
be missing some middle ground here. Realism is compatible with the claim that we can have 
knowledge about how the world is (not merely how it seems according to a given theory), even if 
this knowledge is incomplete and approximate in places.  Further, the notion of a perspective relies 
heavily on analogy to different spatial perspectives on an object, and it is not clear how well this 
analogy tracks with scientific modeling practice. Van Fraassen makes heavy use of this visual 
perspective metaphor, as does Rueger. Giere relies heavily on the case of our visual perception of 
color. Morrison (2015) seems to agree that perspectivism is unduly epistemically modest. She 
grants that in some cases, multiple incompatible models are an indication that we are not justified 
in believing that the models truly represent. An example of this is the case of incompatible models 
of atomic nuclei. Some models behave classically, as in the liquid drop model, while other models 
behave quantum mechanically, as in the shell model. These differences in models of atomic nuclei 
are differences on a fundamental level. They represent structure of the nucleus as responsible for 
different kinds of behavior. Morrison cites this incompatibility as evidence against the 
representational veracity of either model. She notes that in the context of our current state of 
knowledge of the atomic nucleus, these models are largely phenomenological. Given the state of 
the evidence, there is not a single model of the nucleus about which we are warranted to be realists.  
In contrast to models of atomic nuclei, Morrison cites various models of fluid mechanics 
as examples of models that seem incompatible, but which do not warrant antirealism, or even some 
kind of perspectivism. These models differ from those of the atomic nucleus, because these are 
complementary, rather than contradictory. That is, while none of the models gives an accurate 
representation of an entire fluid system, each one gives an accurate representation of some part of 
the fluid system. What makes this work in the case of fluid mechanics, but not models of the atomic 
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nuclei, is that the underlying assumptions about fluids are the same across all of the models. In the 
fluid mechanics case, the models represent different kinds of flows or different parts of the same 
flow. “The models can only ever give an approximate description and with a particular set of 
empirical constraints are valid only for certain flows or ranges of flows.” (Morrison, 2015, p. 173)   
I am in general agreement with Morrison’s approach. Indeed, it seems such a rather 
straightforward approach that one wonders why such incompatible models would trouble a realist 
in the first place. I would emphasize that complementarity is not just about different parts of flows, 
but can also be related to scale. That is, one model is meant to capture some feature of the flow at 
a large scale, and another model is meant to capture some feature of the flow at a smaller scale. 
This sort of complementarity can be used to resolve the apparent incompatibility between 
modeling boundary conditions and conditions at the boundary. Different models get things right 
in under different conditions.  
However, the fact that we can interpret the models of fluid mechanics as complementary 
does not tell us much more than perspectivism does if it does not also explain how different 
conditions give rise to different models, or how different models are linked. Perspectives are 
dependent upon an experimental setup. This is true of both complementary and contradictory 
models. In complementary models, there is an explanation for why the models disagree. Knowing 
that a model fails for a certain perspective is not enough. We need to know why it fails. Answering 
this question, I will contend, often generates more reasons to be a realist than antirealist about 
particular models in fluid mechanics.  
Models are complementary not only in terms of the part of the world they represent. They 
are also complementary with respect to the other conditions that are present in a given system. 
Complementary models are complementary because of the domain of application. The reason they 
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get things right is not a matter of perspective, but rather of the experimental conditions under which 
they were confirmed. Understanding the conditions under which a model is valid helps explain 
why the models are complementary.  
The next section considers the results of recent experimental investigations of the no slip 
boundary condition. These experiments do not only tell us the conditions under which the no slip 
condition is valid, but they also give us insight into why it fails under other conditions. I will argue 
that this insight helps justify our belief in the no slip condition when it is valid. The truth of the 
models is relative to conditions determined by experiments. It gives us knowledge of under what 
conditions a boundary condition applies, where it fails, and why it fails. So instead of painting an 
anti-realist picture, the variety of models instead give a more robust argument for realism.   
This will explain how models are complementary, which goes toward how we can continue 
to be realists when different models say apparently incompatible things. In effect, a model is 
accurate relative to a particular part of a system, but it is also true relative to other conditions that 
are present in the target system. This depends not on perspectives, but on the material conditions. 
While this might not address all of the challenges to realism that stem from modeling practices, it 
provides an explanation for how models can be complementary.  
4.3 The Domain of Application  
Virtually every scientific model has a domain of application. Save perhaps models at the 
most fundamental level of physics (fields or superstrings or whatever the case may be), no model 
is valid without exception. Scientific models are useful under some conditions, and not others. The 
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conditions under which a model accurately describes a target system I call a domain of application. 
To see what I mean by domain of application, I will look at some examples.  
Consider the progression from classical (Newtonian) mechanics to relativistic mechanics. 
Even though Cartwright (1983) has convincingly argued that classical mechanics is technically 
false except under very particular conditions which never actually obtain anyway, it seems strange 
to say that classical mechanics is simply false. We know that classical mechanics is a very good 
approximation (good enough for successful engineering) under certain conditions. While it 
provides a very good approximation in the limit of low velocities and low gravity, we find that as 
a given system departs from this domain, the approximation of classical mechanics gets worse and 
worse. Since we understand the how classical mechanics arises in certain conditions, we should 
be more confident in its approximate truth in those conditions. By learning that relativistic 
mechanics reduces to classical mechanics, we are more justified in our belief in the approximate 
truth of classical mechanics under low velocity and low gravity conditions.  
The governing equations of fluid dynamics have a domain of application. Generally, fluid 
systems can be categorized by Knudsen number (Kn). There are four flow regimes based on 
Knudsen number of the flow. (Shu, Teo, & Chan, 2017) The Knudsen number is the ratio of 
molecular mean free path length to a representative physical length scale. In the no-slip regime 
(Kn<0.001), the governing equations of fluid dynamics along with the no-slip condition are valid. 
In the slip flow regime (0.001<Kn<0.1), the governing equations are valid but there is slip at the 
boundary. Intuitively, we can think of a fluid that is rarified enough that molecules bounce along 
the solid surface, and where interactions with other fluid molecules are less frequent. In the 
transition regime (0.1<Kn<10), the governing equations of fluid dynamics begin to become 
questionable as the continuum assumption is no longer able to capture all of the relevant behaviors 
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of the system. In the free-molecular flow regime (Kn>10), the continuum assumption is no longer 
of any use, and molecular dynamics must be used to describe the system. So once we leave the no-
slip regime, not only does the no slip condition break down, but so do the basic assumptions of 
fluid dynamics, generally. 
In fact, dimensionless numbers, like Knudsen numbers, which relate relative magnitudes 
of fluid properties are a good place to look for this kind of evidence for realism. For example, the 
Reynolds number (Re) of a fluid flow relates inertial forces to viscous forces. It can be used to 
predict when the transition from laminar to turbulent flow occurs. Mach number (Ma) relates flow 
velocity to the local speed of sound. A flow’s Mach number determines the character to the 
governing equations that describe the flow. For Mach numbers less than 1, the governing equations 
are elliptic. If it is greater than 1, the governing equations are hyperbolic.   
The important thing to note is not just that we can identify the domain of application. The 
important thing is that we can have causal knowledge of how manipulating certain conditions 
affects the model in question. These domains of application are essential in understanding how 
models complement each other. While the conclusions I have drawn in the other chapters have 
been limited to the boundary conditions of fluid dynamics, I think the pattern of reasoning here 
can be applied quite generally. Almost every theory has some domain of validity, which defines 
the domain of application of its associated models. So almost every model fails under some 
circumstances. These failures are often places to look for new physics. The fact that these domains 
exist, and the models that explain them, are themselves interesting empirical facts that had to be 
discovered.  
Models characterized by classical or relativistic mechanics and models characterized by 
the governing equations of fluid dynamics are relatively large classes of models. In the next 
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section, I will show how the concept of a domain of application applies to more particular parts of 
models, resulting in a domain of application for a smaller class of models. In particular, I will look 
at the domain of application of models that include the no-slip boundary condition.  
4.3.1  Domain of Application of the No-Slip Condition 
The previous section looked at domains of application for relatively broad classes of 
models. But the concept of a domain of application extends to smaller parts of models as well. 
This results in the possibility of fine-grained cleaving of domains of application. The domain of 
application of the no-slip condition is limited to a subset of the domain of application of the broader 
theory in which it is contained. Within the domain of application of fluid dynamics models, 
generally, the domain of particular parts of fluid models is further limited. Like the velocity limits 
the domain of special relativity and Knudsen numbers limit the domain of fluid dynamics, other 
factors put limits on smaller parts of the models as well. The appropriate boundary conditions 
depend on the conditions of the fluid flow.   
The no-slip condition is further limited to fluids that have non-zero viscosity. Almost all 
real fluids have some viscosity, even if fluids with very little viscosity can be modeled as if they 
have zero viscosity. Actual zero viscosity is only seen at extremely low temperatures in fluids 
known as superfluids. Whether or not we model a fluid as viscous determines which governing 
equations we use. Recall from Chapter 1 that the governing equations have both viscous and non-
viscous forms. For a viscous flow in which the no-slip conditions holds, both the normal and 
tangential velocities go to zero at the boundary. For an inviscid flow, only the normal velocity goes 
to zero.  
 96 
The no-slip condition is also limited to Newtonian fluids. Roughly, Newtonian fluids are 
fluids with a constant viscosity that is independent of stress.14 Non-Newtonian fluids not only 
display slip, but require changes to the governing equations for describing the entire flow. 
(Schowalter, 1988) For example, a shear-thickening liquid is a liquid whose viscosity increases 
with shear rate.15 To describe the flow of a shear-thickening liquid, the form of the governing 
equation must take into account that viscosity is dependent on shear rate, rather than constant.  
The failure of the no-slip condition in high Knudsen, non-Newtonian, or non-viscous 
contexts corresponds to the failure of other theoretical assumptions as well. Outside of slip and no-
slip Knudsen regimes, the continuum assumption of fluid dynamics is no longer accurate, nor are 
the governing equations. And modelling inviscid or non-Newtonian fluids also require alterations 
to the governing equations. So it should not be surprising that common boundary conditions also 
fail under these conditions. However, not all failures of the no-slip condition are accompanied by 
failures of other parts of fluid dynamics. There are other limitations to the domain of the no-slip 
condition’s application, which are specific to the no-slip condition. Understanding these 
limitations will allow us to isolate the casual factors that explain slip phenomena. 
                                                 
14 More technically, in Newtonian fluids, the stress tensor, which consists of the normal components and the 
viscous stress tensor, is a liner function of the velocity gradient. (Karniadakis, Beskok, & Aluru, 2005, p. 52) 
15 A common example of a shear-thickening liquid is “oobleck,” a mixture of cornstarch and water that has 
become a canonical kitchen science experiment for children. 
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4.3.2  Domains of Application and the Reality of Slip 
The domain of application for the no-slip condition can be reduced to an even finer grained 
description. For most macroscopic applications, the no-slip condition works well in the domain of 
viscous Newtonian fluid flows. However, even in flows that satisfy these conditions, it is still an 
open question as to whether the velocity of a fluid flow literally goes to zero at the boundary. In 
previous chapters, I characterized the function of boundary conditions as constraining the behavior 
of the governing equations. However, they do also describe a part of the system. The no-slip 
condition constrains the solutions to a particular flow, and in doing so, it also describes the velocity 
of the fluid at the boundary as zero. We can ask the question of whether that description is literally 
true. At the macroscopic scale, fluid flows certainly behave as if it is true. But there are reasons to 
look beyond the macroscopic scale, and the question of slip takes on much more practical 
importance when looking at small systems. In flows through passages with diameters on the order 
of micrometers or nanometers, boundary effects become much more important, as the region near 
the boundary represents a significant proportion of the overall flow. Even a small amount of slip 
can have a large effect on the flow. There is evidence that fluid dynamics can describe flows 
through channels as small as 10 molecular diameters. Any smaller than that, though, and molecular 
dynamics must be used to describe the flow. (Karniadakis, Beskok, & Aluru, 2005) While the no-
slip condition seems to get things right at the macroscopic level, it is still an open question as to 
whether it holds at smaller scales, even for Newtonian fluids.  
Despite the no-slip condition being the default textbook boundary condition for Newtonian 
flows, the actual behavior of fluids near a solid boundary is still not entirely understood. While the 
no-slip condition is useful in predicting flow fields, the question of whether or not we should 
interpret it realistically still seems to be open. Lauga, Brenner and Stone (2007, p. 1220) write that  
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“a century of experimental results in liquids and theories derived assuming the no-slip boundary 
condition (i.e., λ = 0) had the consequence that today many textbooks of fluid dynamics fail to 
mention that the no-slip boundary condition remains an assumption.” Similarly, Shu, Teo, and 
Chan (2017, p. 2) point out that “the no-slip boundary condition originated as an assumption 
without any fundamental basis.” Further, Neto et al. (2005, p. 2859) note that the no-slip condition 
“has been applied successfully to model many macroscopic experiments, but has no microscopic 
justification.” They go on to say that by the “mid-20th century […] it had been unanimously 
accepted that even if slip occurred, it would have been detected using only experimental techniques 
with resolution far beyond that available at the time.” (p. 2864)  Despite our incomplete knowledge 
of slip conditions, the ongoing experimental investigation of slip has produced a great deal of 
information about the conditions under which slip occurs.  
The no-slip condition depends on a number of factors that are important for implementing 
the correct fluid dynamics generally. But the domain of application of the no-slip condition is even 
further limited by other factors such as surface roughness, dissolved gas and bubbles, wetting 
properties, shear rate, and electrical properties. (Lauga, Brenner, & Stone, 2007). These factors do 
not affect fluid models as broadly as Knudsen numbers or viscosity do, so they are better suited to 
investigating the no-slip condition itself. Even in the no-slip regime, we can ask if no-slip condition 
ever literally obtains. Under some conditions, there appears to be slip in Newtonian fluids. 
Experimental investigations seek to not only quantify this slip but explain it as well. In most cases, 
it is concluded that the reason is apparent slip. Regardless of whether it is actual slip at the 
molecular scale or merely apparent slip, the results indicate that slip is dependent on a number of 
physical parameters. I will look at how some of these factors affect slip, in order to illustrate the 
 99 
point that experiments and models investigating the limits of no-slip generate evidence in favor of 
a realist interpretation of the no-slip condition.  
One factor that affects slip is the wetting properties of the fluid on the surface. The wetting 
behavior of a fluid can be characterized with a contact angle. The contact angle quantifies how 
hydrophobic or hydrophilic a surface is. There is a correlation between the contact angle and the 
degree of slip. This makes intuitive sense, as one could imagine fluid slipping more readily across 
a hydrophobic surface rather than a hydrophilic one. And indeed there does seem to be a 
connection between the wetting properties of a fluid-solid pair and whether or not slip behavior is 
observed. In the case of wetting behavior, models have been developed to predict slip based on 
contact angle. One of these models that has been proposed is the Tolstoi model (Blake, 1990):  
 
 𝜆𝜆
𝜎𝜎
~ exp �𝛼𝛼𝜎𝜎2𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐)
𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇
� − 1 Equation 16 Tolstoi model 
 
where λ is slip length, σ is a characteristic molecular length, α is a dimensionless geometrical 
parameter of order one, γ is the liquid surface tension, θc is the contact angle, kB is Boltzmann’s 
constant, and T is temperature. Models like this, which quantify the relationship between slip and 
contact angle, are robust evidence for a causal relationship of an interventionist sort.  
Another factor that affects the amount of slip observed at a fluid-solid boundary is the 
surface roughness of the solid. The effect of surface roughness is more difficult to quantify than 
the effects of wetting properties. Experiments have shown that depending on the kind of fluid and 
the kind of surface, surface roughness can increase liquid friction. While the precise mechanism is 
not fully understood, it is thought that local irregularities in the flow cause the dissipation of 
mechanical energy. But even though the exact mechanism is not known, both physical experiments 
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and simulations have been able to quantify the degree of roughness necessary to produce the no-
slip condition at a macroscopic level.  
Zhu & Granick (2002) find that as surface roughness increases, so does agreement with the 
no slip condition. For a given surface roughness, slip can be induced when the shear rate of the 
fluid flow reaches some critical level. However, this critical shear rate diverges when surface 
roughness exceeds a route mean square (rms) roughness of approximately 6 nanometers, where 
rms roughness is the calculated root mean square of the surface’s microscopic peaks and valleys. 
Molecular dynamics models attempt to describe the degree of slip under various surface 
roughness conditions. For example, Koplik, Banavar, & Willemsen (1989) find that for certain 
kinds of flows, molecular roughness give rise to a no-slip boundary condition. However, Galea & 
Attard (2004) find that in other circumstances, rough surfaces lead to slip. This might be due to 
surface energies causing spontaneous dewetting of the solid surface, producing a hydrophobic 
state.  
These experimental and simulation results work in concert with models derived from 
theoretical understanding. For example, Jansons (1988) calculated that, under certain roughness 
conditions, very small amounts of surface roughness produce a slip condition that will approximate 
the no-slip condition at the macroscopic level. In particular, one defect on the order of 10-9 m per 
10-7 m2 with produce a slip length of 10-5 m. Similarly, Casado-Diaz, Fernandez, & Simon (2003) 
calculate that for a characteristic length scale L and surface features of size a, as a/L → 0, the 
velocity at the surface approaches 0. That is, the no-slip condition is recovered. These calculations 
result from the description of viscous dissipation. This is the transformation of kinetic energy to 
heat energy in turbulent flows.  
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The experiments regarding the effects of surface roughness on slip paint a complex picture. 
The factors that affects slip are not independent of each other either. Both surface roughness and 
wetting properties affect the formation of gas bubbles.  
Surface roughness is connected with another condition that affects slip: the formation of 
gas between the surface and the fluid. Shu, Teo, & Chan (2017) find that slip might depend not 
just on whether the surface is rough, but also on how the fluid contacts a rough surface. On the one 
hand, the fluid can fill the crevices on a rough surface (Wenzel state). On the other hand, the fluid 
can sit above the crevices (Cassie state). Which of these two states the fluid has depends on the 
properties of the fluid involved, but generally a Wenzel state results in less slip. It is thought that 
any slip is lost via viscous dissipation. Conversely, a Cassie state results in significant slip. A 
Cassie state can result in pockets of gas that form between peaks of the microscopically rough 
surface. This way, the fluid flows over alternating regions of no-slip (solid) and slip (gas).  
If instead of a collection of gas pockets or bubbles, there is a layer of gas between a liquid 
and a solid, the depth and viscosity of the gas layer can be used to predict apparent slip:  
 
 𝜆𝜆 = ℎ �𝜇𝜇1
𝜇𝜇2
− 1� 
Equation 17 Apparent slip length 
 
where λ is slip length, h is the height of the gas layer, and μ1 and μ2 are the viscosities of the liquid 
and the gas, respectively. Relations such as these give us deeper insight into the causal relationship 
between the no-slip condition and the condition under which it holds.  
Rather than falsifying the no-slip condition, experiments that explore these relationships 
are taken as evidence of the truth of no-slip, under certain conditions. These experiments do more 
than either confirm or disconfirm the no-slip boundary condition. They help define the no-slip 
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condition’s domain of application. In so doing, they incidentally offer reasons to hold a realist 
attitude toward no-slip. By framing in its edges more carefully, the resulting picture is more clearly 
defined.  
Importantly, there is no critical experiment here to once and for all establish the truth of 
the no-slip condition. This is an example of a consensus emerging from contemporary 
experimental work. As more theoretical frameworks, more modeling techniques, more 
mathematical, simulation, and experimental methods pile on to the study of slip, they have 
uncovered a significant class of situations in the real world to which no-slip applies. Using 
Michelangelo’s famous analogy, it is a sort of realism that is achieved by cutting out the excess 
marble and revealing the sculpture that was already there. 
In this section, I have shown how experiments at the boundaries of the no-slip condition 
generate rationales for why no-slip should be trusted in cases where it is employed. Under a 
received view of the relation between models and theories, due largely to Cartwright, Suarez, and 
Shomar (1995) and Cartwright (1999), and supplemented by Woodward’s (2003) interventionist 
account of causal explanation, this line of scientific investigation has revealed causal relationships 
between a variety of flow features and the no-slip boundary condition. Intervening on the 
conditions of the fluid system has a systematic effect on the effectiveness of the no-slip condition. 
Further, we have good theoretical reasons for why these relationships should hold.  
4.4 Reasons to be Realists 
Despite models giving conflicting descriptions of the world, I follow Morrison in 
understanding these models as complementary. In defining a model’s domain of application, I take 
 103 
a closer look at just how models can be complementary. Understanding the causal relationship 
between a model and a domain of application allows us to make stronger statement about the truth 
of the aspect of the model in question.  
In contrast to most arguments for realism, which focus on a theory’s success, this one relies 
on its failures as well. To summarize: the no-slip condition is a highly successful feature of fluid 
modeling practices. Despite this success, it is still unobservable, and so gives rise to doubts that it 
is literally true. There is evidence that it fails under some conditions, and experiments have 
provided insight into those conditions. Based on our best understanding of the results of these 
experiments, we are able to learn how intervening on those conditions affects the no-slip condition. 
Thus we gain causal knowledge about the failure of the no-slip condition. Boundary conditions 
display some degree of invariance under interventions, and there is a pattern of causal dependence 
that is exploited.  
The kinds of relations that emerge from the experimental evidence give us a means of 
differentiating the strength of the evidence. Some evidence gives more robust relationships 
between the no-slip condition and the conditions under which it fails. When there is a quantifiable 
relationship between a variable and the degree of slip, as there is in the case of gas layers, we have 
more robust causal knowledge. In contrast, when the evidence does not yield a definite 
relationship, or the evidence is ambiguous, the inferred causal connection is not as strong. The 
effect of surface roughness, for example, is not easily quantifiable. At present, I think the evidence 
gives us reason to be realists about the no-slip condition. Further investigation might strengthen 
the causal relationship between certain flow conditions and the no-slip condition. If they do, then 
we have more evidence to be realists about the no-slip condition in its intended domain. If not, 
then we have evidence to be skeptical of the literal truth of the no-slip condition.  
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Some features of this pattern of reasoning should be familiar to realists. It is, in some ways, 
an extension of some other arguments for realism. This could be thought of as a form of inference 
to the best explanation. The reality of the no-slip condition under certain conditions is part of the 
explanation for the casual relationships we find. The thing that distinguishes this account is the 
emphasis on explanations of failure. The standard inference-to-the-best-explanation argument for 
realism focuses on the success of theories, so understanding the conditions under which a boundary 
condition is successful provides evidence for that boundary condition. But on my account, 
understanding the conditions under which it fails also provides evidence. If a model makes good 
predictions in some conditions, but not others, this alone is not enough to be a realist about it. But 
if we can understand the reason for its failure in those other conditions, then we have reason to be 
confident it its truth for the conditions in which it works well. 
The focus on intervention should also bring to mind the slogan of the entity realism 
proposed by Ian Hacking as a response, in part, to his dissatisfaction with empirical adequacy: “If 
you can spray them, then they are real.” (Hacking, 1983, p. 23) If we can manipulate an entity, 
even one that is not directly observable, that manipulation counts as evidence that the entity is real. 
Unsurprisingly, I am sympathetic to this response. I see this discussion as an extension of 
Hacking’s view: in my argument, it is not successful manipulation of an entity that is doing the 
work, but rather manipulation of a variable, more generally conceived. The objects of 
manipulation are the variables like surface roughness, the presence of gas layers, and surface 
wettability. Their manipulation not only “saves” them, it also gives evidence that their causal 
nexus—that is, the no-slip condition—is real.  
I want to make one more remark about my argument for the reality of the no-slip condition. 
In the realism literature, philosophers enjoy contrasting real things with “mere” phenomena. That 
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artificially limits the sorts of things that are candidates for reality to objects and entities. Part of 
what I am arguing here is that other stuff that populates models, the variables and parameters that 
don’t neatly latch on to entities and objects, should also be candidates for reality. The causal 
powers of the no-slip condition, the manipulability they generate, the ways that manipulability is 
studied through direct experimentation and modeling, and especially the careful study of the 
domain of application of no-slip models: these are all evidence for a Hacking-style abduction to 
the reality of the no-slip condition itself, not merely the reality of the fluid or the pipe.  
The idea that a model’s domain of application assists in generating rationales for realism 
about certain phenomena encoded in the model is not just important for cases of apparently 
conflicting models. Recall that the antirealist argument from incompatible models grows out of 
more general concerns (e.g. Cartwright) about modeling practices. The fact that models are 
idealized or only obtain under very particular conditions does not warrant antirealism, as long as 
we understand how deviations from those conditions affect their approximation to the world by 
affecting their domains of application. It might be the case that the no-slip condition very rarely 
literally obtains. But it is a very good approximation under some conditions.  
4.4.1  Local Realism 
Finally, I will say a little bit about the kind of realism this argument supports. It does not 
support a global realism. That is, it does not show that we can make a generalized inference from 
our successful theories to their truth. Instead, it supports a more local realism, in the spirit of 
(Wimsatt, 2007). Not all models should be regarded as literally true. But this should not lead us to 
conclude that we cannot tell which models represent the world accurately and which models do 
not. This should allow us to identify which models should be regarded as literally (approximately) 
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true, rather than merely phenomenological. This argument depends on more than just the predictive 
or explanatory success of the model. Rather, the details of its success and failures inform our 
epistemic attitude. Almost every theory has a domain of application, outside of which it breaks 
down. 
There are apparent similarities between what I am calling local realism and some versions 
of perspectivism. And it might be thought that the two views are in fact compatible. Giere (2006), 
for example, considers his position to be genuinely realist. And Callebaut (2012) even labels 
Wimsatt’s local realism as a variety of perspectivism. For my own purposes, if there are versions 
of perspectivism that are compatible with local realism, then so much the better for both views. 
However, the versions of perspectivism put forward by at least Giere and van Fraassen do not 
claim the level of epistemic support for the unconditionalized truth of some models that local 
realism does.  
The sort of local realism that I am arguing for is epistemically more ambitious than 
perspectivism. Recall that on Giere’s characterization of perspectivism, the strongest claim we can 
make about what we know about the world is: “According to this highly confirmed theory (or 
reliable instrument), the world seems to be roughly such and such.” (Giere, 2006, p. 6) In place of 
this, I posit that we can make the stronger claim: due to this highly confirmed theory, model, or 
reliable instrument, under certain specifiable physical conditions, this part of the world is roughly 
such and such. The scope of the truth being claimed in this view extends beyond perspectivism’s 
mere seemings and beyond the model itself, although it is obtained through the model. 
In Rueger’s perspectivism (2005), properties of a system like viscosity are not “intrinsic.” 
Instead, they are “relational.” Similar to Giere’s view, in Rueger’s view, we have knowledge about 
what a system looks like rather than knowledge about what it is like. As Rueger puts it, “from this 
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perspective, the system looks as if it has intrinsic property x, and from that perspective, the system 
looks like it has property y.” (2005, p. 580) On my account the relation is not between a model 
and the target system, but between the phenomenon being modeled and the physical conditions 
under which it occurs or not.  
As I suggested above, the mundane and human-scale nature of slip makes it the sort of 
phenomenon that it is easy to be a realist about. For a given system, there is slip, or there is not. If 
one model includes slip, and another model of the system does not, perspectivism would simply 
consider these models two different perspectives. But the representational successes and failures 
of each model can serve as further ways of comparing and evaluating the models, so that we can 
move beyond merely perspectival approaches. The correctness of a model is determined by facts 
about the system it is supposed to represent. And as the argument from the domain of application 
of the no-slip condition shows, these facts can apply to fine-grained parts of models. Looking at 
how the no-slip condition depends on the conditions of a flow shows how modelers can identify 
and explore particular elements of a model. While the model depends on a variety of assumptions 
and background knowledge, the experiments are (contra Quine) effective ways of questioning a 
particular part of a model. Experimenters are able to isolate the boundary condition. There is 
perhaps an in-principle argument to be made about the inseparability of the no-slip condition from 
the models that contains it: a boundary condition always works with other parts of a model, and 
the inability to directly observe the velocity at the boundary means that the model necessarily 
requires other assumptions to derive empirical consequences. But in practice, these are held fixed. 
The piecemeal fashion in which the no-slip condition is confirmed is evidence for a local realism. 
Rather than an argument about successful theories, generally, the debate over realism takes place 
at the level of individual models.  
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This pattern of reasoning should be used in conjunction with other evidence for realism 
with respect to particular theories or models. They are not only predictively successful, but they 
are able to be investigated via multiple means of detection. They are also subject to more direct 
means of detection, to the point of being called observable.  
The upshot of the above considerations is that there has been a deep failure in much of the 
literature on scientific realism so far. The use of scientific models is a problem if the realist makes 
an argument based on a general scheme from explanatory or predictive success to truth. These 
sorts of virtues should be thought of as characteristic of true theories, and surely do carry epistemic 
weight; we should count these as evidence that some entity or property is real. But by themselves, 
these virtues are not enough evidence to distinguish models that give a realistic representation from 
those that are instrumentally useful but not realistic. Instead, the details of precisely how the 
entities and properties are being detected should inform the epistemic attitude we take towards 
them. 
I think the above is an indication that the only defensible realism is a local, as opposed to 
global, realism. We are not warranted in making claims like “our best (most successful, 
explanatory, well-confirmed) scientific theories are true.” Since the details of confirmation and 
detection are varied, we can only proceed on a case by case basis. Then the argument for local 
realism with respect to a given entity or property depends, not on an abstract confirmation scheme 
(e.g. theory T predicts O, O obtains, therefore T receives some degree of confirmation), but on the 
details of experimental detection and the surrounding theoretical support. This echoes Giere’s 
rationale for perspectivism, but the domains of application are not perspectives. They are facts 
about the world.  
 109 
Finally, the thing that a perspectivism like Giere’s gets right is that it relativizes our 
epistemic attitude toward a model to certain conditions. Despite rejection of global realism, I think 
we can say something about the way we confirm our models with respect to the experimental 
settings in which they are confirmed. Ultimately our reason for believing the truth of any theory is 
the experimental evidence, and we run into trouble when we separate our theories from the 
conditions in which they are confirmed. We run into trouble when we make claims like “the world 
is roughly such and such” instead of “the world is roughly such and such, when such and such 
conditions obtain.” Compare this to Giere’s formulation of perspectival realism, according to 
which, we should not treat our well confirmed scientific models as completely objective 
representations of our world. Instead of trying to justify claims like “This theory (or instrument) 
provides us with a complete and literally correct picture of the world itself,” the best we can do is 
to justify claims like, “According to this highly confirmed theory (or reliable instrument), the 
world seems to be roughly such and such.” (Giere, 2006, p. 6) But I am not talking about 
perspectives here; I am talking about differences in the world. For example, we often treat systems 
at different spatial scales. But a spatial scale is not a perspective. It is true that systems do look 
different at different scales, but the behavior we see when we look is the dominant behavior at that 
scale whether we are looking or not.   
This is how we get the pluralism, and still retain local realism. Instead of saying the world 
is thus and so from some perspective, we can say that the world is thus and so, given certain 
conditions. These conditions are not a matter of perspective, but are objective features of the world.  
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4.5 Conclusions 
In examining the experimental investigation of slip phenomena, I have argued that we find 
a pattern of reasoning that helps inform our epistemic attitude toward some unobservable parts of 
our models. Understanding the limits of our theories should increase our belief that they are true, 
more than the existence of those limits should decrease the belief that they are true. This paints a 
picture that is in line with both realist interpretations and actual modeling practices. 
I have argued that the modeling practices surrounding the no-slip condition support the 
complementary nature of some models. The epistemic attitude we take towards a model depends 
on its domain of application. Once we take that into account, apparent incompatibilities are not a 
threat to realism, as long as we understand that realism does not commit us to the view that a model 
is absolutely true.  
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